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STATmVIEINT OF JURISDICTION .-. 
Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of uie l_-tah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and \.Ui,: l ode Ann. 
§78A-4-103(2)(h) confer jurisdiction upon this court to hear this appeal.. ^  . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
| I in Uriel <il '"IppcllLiiil leh'i i In Ilk pailii,"* IVtiiliniiu' ^ppellaul as Vuonu.i .iiiiiui 
"Respondent/. \r"-:llee"as"Guenther " Iliis Brief will continue to i lse those references for 
the parties.] 
I. THE CLERICAL ERRORS IN THE BRIEF OF APPELL \NT V 4 V T-f — 
EGRFGTOT^ 4S T ^ ™\RRANT SAN^ T r n ] V Q 
eompl) with briefing requirements and this issue is reviewed under the abuse wf discretion 
standard. 
•' While we decline to sanction '". under rule 24(k), we warn, future. litigants that 
compliance with our briefing requirements is not discretionary, and litigants 
who fail to comply take the risk that we may disregard or strike briefs or 
arguments. See? e^g., Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n. 20071 JT'2,-
P 23, 151 P.3d 962 . . . . [emphasis added.] 
Madsen v. Wash. Mut Bank FSB. 2008 I IT 60; 611 Hah Ad\. Rep. 29. 
.. .we recognize that we may disregard or stn* i nt do not comply with 
the requirements of rule 24. See id. R. 24(k) en we are not obligated 
to strike or disregard a marginal or inacequate um ., State v. Gamblim 2000 
UT 44. P <\ I P.3d 1108 (emphasis added), and we usually reserve such a 
harsh sanction tor eases where the noncompliance with rule 24 is much more 
egregious than that here... [emphasis added.] 
Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT Apr P0 . n 1. 176P ~d 464/'' 
H. -..VERONICA DID NOT MARSHAL 1 HE EVIDENCE TO SHOW JUDICIAL 
ERROR or ABUSE OF JUDTCTAl DTSCRFTTON RY TTTF TRT4T rOTTRT 
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IN ITS FINDING THAT THE PARTIES5 POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT (the 
"DIVORCE AGREEMENT") IS ENFORCEABLE. 
A. Contracts Between Spouse are Enforceable. 
B. It Was Not Judicial Error to State the Rule of Law that Ambiguities in 
Contracts Should be Resolved Against the Drafter 
. . . parties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing 
court will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings. 
See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P82 n.16, 100 P.3d 1177 (explaining that 
the marshaling requirement is critical because in its absence the appellate court 
"must go behind the trial court's factual findings," which often requires a 
"colossal commitment of time and resources"). 
Traco Steel Erectors. Inc. v. Control Inc.. 2009 UT 81; 645 Utah Adv. Rep. 30. 
"in order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists." Neelv v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, P l l , 51 P.3d 724 
(emphasis omitted). This does not mean that the party may simply provide an 
exhaustive review of all evidence presented at trial. Id. at P12 n.l. Rather, 
appellants must provide a precisely focused summary of all the evidence 
supporting the findings they challenge. JcL This summary must correlate all 
particular items of evidence with the challenged findings and then convince us 
that the trial court erred in the assessment of that evidence to its findings. W. 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv.. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
What appellants cannot do is merely re-argue the factual case they presented 
in the trial court. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc., 872 
P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82. Because Veronica has not properly marshaled the evidence, 
this Court should accept the Findings of Fact of the trial court and affirm the enforceability 
of the Divorce Agreement. 
ffl. VERONICA FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF THE 
PARTIES' FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 
A. Award of Extra Payments to Retire Mortgage 
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B. Award of Escrow Account Interest 
C. Date of Division of Financial Accounts 
".... even if the trial court[fs divorce decree] does not exactly follow the parties' 
agreement, such a decree is still within the court's reasonable discretion." 
Jensen v.Jensem 2008 UT App 392; 197 P.3d 117. 
"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining . . . property 
distribution in divorce cases, and [their decisions] will be upheld on appeal 
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." 
Trubetzkov v. Trubetzkov, 2009 UT App. 77; 215 P.3d 161. 
Guenther contends that Veronica has failed to properly "marshal [all of] the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings and then ... show that the findings are unsupported." 
Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233 "(citing UtahR. App. P. 24(a)(9)); 217 P.3d733. 
This Court has found the trial court is in the best position to determine if an 
inheritance has lost its separate character. Veronica failed to provide any evidence at trial 
regarding whether she has by 
"her efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the inherited or donated 
property, when the parties have inextricably commingled the property with 
marital property so that it has lost its separate character, or when the recipient 
spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital 
estate."Schaumbergv. Schaumberg. 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)).... "The question of whether a gift or inheritance has remained separate 
is highly fact intensive and the trial court is in the best position to weigh the 
evidence and make that determination." 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker. 2008 UT App 11, P 29, 176 P.3d 476. 
IV. VERONICA FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF or MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE, TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS AS AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION, IN THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF THE REMAINDER 
OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
Page 3 of 29 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a party's 
argument include citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not 
just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority. We have previously stated that this court is 
not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research.'1 State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
State v. Scott, 2009 UT App 367. Veronica did not cite authorities or statutes that support 
her claim that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the parties' personal property. 
Neither did Veronica marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
show this Court the "fatal flaw" in the trial court's ruling. 
V. VERONICA FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF HER REQUEST FOR A 
REVIEW OF ATTORNEY'S FEES or MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN LIMITING THE 
AMOUNT OF FEES AWARDED TO HER. 
Veronica did not cite case authorities or statutes to support her request that the trial 
court review the amount of attorney's fees if this matter is remanded. Neither did she 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings as to the award of attorney's fees, 
and then find the fatal flaw which would show an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Veronica omitted the fact that the trial court considered the reasonableness of her attorney's 
fees and her knowing and willful violation of prior orders in determining the amount of 
attorney's fees she would receive. The trial court also considered her need and Guenther's 
ability to assist her as required by Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY OR RULE PROVISIONS 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations or case law 
Page 4 of 29 
whose interpretation is determinative, are set out verbatim in the Addendum to Brief of 
Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the division of the marital estate as contained in the final order 
of the Third District Court, by the Honorable Denise Lindberg. [Again, the initial brief filed 
by Appellant refers to the Petitioner/Appellant as "Veronica" and the Respondent/Appellee 
as "Guenther," the brief will use the same designations.] 
Veronica has appealed: (I) the trial court's ruling that the Divorce Agreement, 
"drafted by Petitioner [Veronica], with modifications provided by Respondent [Guenther], 
is an enforceable contract entered into by the parties in contemplation of divorce...[and], is 
essence, a partial stipulation..." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and'Order, dated 
June, 19,2008, p. 19, para. 22, Addendum #1); (II) the trial court's categorical rejection of 
Veronica's claim to one-half of Guenther's inheritance based solely on Veronica's claim that 
she had retained signing authority on the account into which he deposited those funds 
(FOF/COL, p. 34, para. 32.); (Ill) the trial court's award of the interest from the escrow 
account holding the sales proceeds of the former marital residence to "the party claiming the 
interest on the escrow account [on his or her tax filings]" (Decree of Divorce; R.O.A.403; 
para. 8.(b)); (IV) the trial court's acceptance of Veronica's testimony that she "changed and 
separated [her] accounts so [she] had her own accounts on May 25,2001" (Tr 84, L 15 thru 
19) and using May 25,2001 as the date the parties separated their financial accounts; (V) the 
trial court's determination of the date of valuation of the automobile (using Veronica's 
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December 2005 Financial Declaration, FOF/COL, p. 12, L 4) and the furnishings awarded 
to Veronica (the time of purchase, FOF/COL, p. 11, para. C); and (VI) the amount of 
attorney's fees awarded to Veronica. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Both parties worked for Hexcel Corporation and met at a work production 
meeting in Decatur, Alabama, in December 1996. (Tr 7 L 13-25.) 
2. Guenther had asked Veronica to move to Salt Lake City, Utah, but that was not 
acceptable to Veronica without marriage and Guenther subsequently proposed. (Tr 9 L 11-
23; 209 L 13-16.) 
3. Veronica resigned from her job, received approximately $6,000.00 from the 
sale of her Decatur home, and moved into Guenther's home in Kearns; Utah, approximately 
June 2,1997. (Tr 10 L 12-25.) Veronica's proceeds from the sale of the Decatur home were 
deposited into a joint account. (Tr 11 L 2-3.) 
4. The parties subsequently sold the Kearns residence, which had been placed in 
both parties' names (Tr 47 L 6-10), and used the proceeds towards the purchase and 
construction of another home ("Terra Vista") in May 2000. (Tr 16 L 2-5.) 
5. In February 2001 and in contemplation of a divorce, Veronica filled out "on 
line" forms for Divorce (Tr 83 L 19-15), but never filed those forms with any court. (Tr 83 
L 19-22.) 
6. In April 2001, Guenther moved out of the Terra Vista home, at Veronica's 
request. (Tr 135 L 7-9). Veronica continued to reside at Terra Vista with her son from 
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another relationship, paying only utilities. Veronica testified that she jointly paid home 
maintenance expenses, but provided no documentation as to any repairs or costs of repairs. 
Guenther paid the mortgage for Terra Vista, the property taxes and insurance for Terra Vista. 
(Tr89L12-90L17. ) 
7. In May of 2001, Veronica became worried that Guenther may leave the 
marriage when he secured his green card (Tr 30 L 10-1 land 31 L 1-5). So, Veronica drafted 
the document referred to by the trial court and the parties as the "Divorce Agreement" (Tr 
30 L 2) "just in case he decided to take off" (Tr 31 L 25). Veronica testified that "after we 
signed the agreement, he was very nicer to me than before." (Tr 32 L 6-7.) 
8. The Divorce Agreement stated, among other things, that (a) "Repair costs for 
the property shall be shared equally" (Veronica's Brief Exhibit B, para. 2.3); (b) "After 
August 2004, mortgage and equity loan payments will be shared in the ratio of actual gross 
income" (Id, para. 4); and (c) that "Veronica shall not seek alimony" (Id, para. 7.) 
9. On May 25, 2001, Veronica changed and separated the parties' banking 
accounts, so she would have her "own accounts" (hereinafter referred to as the "new 
account") (Tr 84 L 15-19). Guenther testified the accounts were divided in April 2001 (Tr 
205 L 5-9). Veronica did give Guenther "access" to the new account. (Tr 84 L 22-23). 
However, Veronica did not close the parties' joint banking account (hereinafter referred to 
as the "original account"), and remained as a signatory on the original account. Guenther did 
not open a new account, but continued to use the original account as his sole and separate 
account. Veronica used the new account as her separate account. Guenther accessed the new 
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account solely for reimbursements. (Tr 85 L 6-86 L 15.) 
10. After accepting employment, Veronica moved to Hong Kong in January 2003. 
(Tr 33 L 19-23.) Veronica's son continued to reside with Guenther in the Terra Vista home 
until he finished high school. (Tr 135 L 14-19.) 
11. Veronica contributed no monies to the mortgage, property taxes or insurance 
at Terra Vista from April 2001 through the date of the sale of the property in August 2006. 
( T r l l l L 10-22.) 
12. During the thirty-two months Veronica was in Hong Kong, Guenther used his 
savings and, approximately $45,000.00 from his inheritance (Tr 204 L 19-21) to make extra 
principal payments, totaling approximately $184,000, to retire the mortgage on the Terra 
Vista home (Tr 203 L 17-19). 
13. During the thirty-two months Veronica was in Hong Kong, her annual salary, 
including a housing allowance, was about $ 104,000.00 (Tr 91 L 8-10). Veronica voluntarily 
left that employment (Tr 91 L 11-13) and returned to Utah to be with her family, even though 
Guenther had said "don't come back without a job." (Tr 92 L 8 - 17.) Veronica arrived in 
Utah in August 2005, and filed the instant divorce action in October 2005. (Tr 99 L 22-25.) 
14. On January 31, 2007, the parties appeared for a bench trial before the 
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg. The trial court requested counsel prepare and submit new 
findings (Tr 222 L 2-4). The trial court also scheduled a telephone conference for February 
2,2007. (Tr 229 L 18-19.) 
15. After reviewing all the testimony and the exhibits and case law, that trial court 
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entered its Ruling on February 2, 2007. (R.O.A. 394, Addendum #2). The trial court 
requested Guenther's counsel prepare the proposed Findings from the ruling and forward 
them to Veronica's counsel for approval. Counsel could not agree on the form of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Veronica's counsel filed her "Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law" on June 4, 2007, but the electronic form was not received 
by the trial court. (R.O.A. 481, p.2, L 15 - p. 3, L 13, Addendum #3.) Guenther's counsel 
filed an Objection to the proposed Findings on June 21,2007, but no further action was taken 
until the trial court dismissed the matter "due to inactivity" on December 6,2007. (R.O.A. 
481, p. 3, L 13- p. 4, L 10, Addendum #3.) 
16. Guenther filed a Motion to Set Aside the Dismissal and the trial court held a 
hearing on that motion on March 27, 2008. The dismissal was set aside and both counsel 
were instructed to file another set of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
electronic format. (R.O.A. 481, p. 5, L 5-21, Addendum #3.) 
17. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 19, 
2008, and the Decree of Divorce was signed and entered on August 25,2008. 
18. Veronica filed a timely Rule 59 motion, urging the trial court to "correct" at 
least one of its Findings and Conclusions. On September 10,2008, Veronica filed a second 
(and untimely) Rule 59 motion. (Addendum #1, p. 1, para. 2 & 3.) 
19. On November 10, 2008, Guenther filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment, and 
Veronica filed a Motion to Stay Enforcement. (Id., p. 2, para. 4.) 
20. After finding that the monies from the sale of Terra Vista had been in escrow 
for more than two and one-half years (Id., p. 3, para. 5), and that "[t]he track record in this 
case is that it has been Petitioner [Veronica] who repeatedly violated court orders" (IcL, p. 
4, para. 4), the trial court denied Veronica's post-trial motions and granted Guenther's 
motion. The escrowed sales proceeds, including the accrued interest, were distributed to the 
parties pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Veronica has apparently either misunderstood or ignored her duty, as a matter of law, 
and as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), to marshal the evidence. Rather than meeting 
the burden of marshaling the evidence, Veronica presented selected facts which favor her 
argument, while, at the same time, omitting critical evidence which supports the trial court's 
findings. In essence, Veronica has merely reargued the factual case,she presented to the trial 
court. 
Veronica did not show any abuse of discretion relating to the trial court's ruling as to 
the parties' Divorce Agreement because, although agreements between spouses are 
enforceable, they are not binding on the court. Neither has Veronica shown any abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's division of the marital property, the award to Guenther of his 
inheritance, or the date of valuation of the marital estate. 
Veronica has failed to marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings 
and then demonstrate that, despite such marshaled evidence, the trial court's findings are 
against the clear weight of the evidence. As such, this Court should accept the trial court's 
findings as valid. 
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Veronica failed to adequately brief her issues of: (1) ambiguities in the Divorce 
Agreement being construed against Veronica as the drafter, or (2) her request that the trial 
court reassess the amount of its attorney's fee award in light of additional areas of success 
as a result of this appeal. Veronica merely states the trial court erred in stating that rule of 
law and that "[i]t is unclear whether this finding had any effect as the court did not note any 
ambiguity in its interpretation of the contract." As to the amount of attorney's fees awarded 
to Veronica, the trial court considered Veronica's need, Guenther's ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of Veronica's fees (Addendum #2, p. 20, L 19- p. 21, L 25.) The trial court 
also found that Veronica was not entitled to a greater award due to her contemptuous actions 
as to prior court orders. Guenther was awarded attorney's fees by the trial court due to 
Veronica's contemptuous acts, and should be awarded his attorney's fees and costs incurred 
in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CLERICAL ERRORS IN THE BRIEF OF APPELLANT MAY BE SO 
EGREGIOUS AS TO WARRANT SANCTIONS. 
Guenther acknowledges, as this Court is aware, that Veronica's Brief has several areas 
which appear not to comply with the Rules 24 and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Veronica set forth her "Statement of Facts" in the "Statement of the Case" section 
beginning on page 3. Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures defines the 
Statement of the Case as a statement indicating "briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below." The Rule goes on to state that "A 
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statement of facts relevant to the issues present for review shall follow." 
Veronica's Brief does not comply with the form set forth in Rule 27 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Subsection (d) requires ". . . the name of the court and judge, 
agency or board below;" which is absent from Veronica's cover. Subsection (b) requires "A 
proportionally spaced typeface must be 13-point or larger for both text and footnotes." 
Subsection (e) allows Veronica to correct these errors within five days. Veronica's Brief 
might have exceeded the 50 page limit set forth in Rule 24(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure if the proper font had been used. Were that the case, Veronica would be required, 
by Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to request permission from the Court 
to file an over length brief. 
Guenther would ask this Court to consider that the entry of the Decree of Divorce (the 
final order from which this appeal is taken) was delayed from the trial date of January 31, 
2007, until August 25, 2008, due to clerical errors and multiple post-trial motions filed by 
Veronica (R.O.A. 481, Motion Hearing, March 27,2008, Addendum #3). In addition, the 
statutory filing deadlines for the appeal process were also extended (approximately five 
months) when this Court temporarily remanded the matter back to the trial court for 
reconstruction of the record to conform to the trial court docket. As these clerical errors 
appear not to be substantive, Guenther has no objection to the Court exercising its discretion 
and accepting Veronica's Brief. With the permission of the Court, Guenther provides his 
responsive Brief as to the issues raised in Veronica's Brief to avoid any further delay in 
resolution of this matter. 
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II. VERONICA DID NOT MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW JUDICIAL 
ERROR or ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN ITS FINDING THAT THE PARTIES' POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT (the 
"DIVORCE AGREEMENT") IS ENFORCEABLE. 
This Court, in Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, acknowledged the lack of understanding 
of the marshaling requirement and, painstakingly restated the requirements of marshaling. 
... an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding 
even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below ... 
... appellant [must] marshal all the evidence in favor of the facts as found by 
the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings of fact.... the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists ...appellants must provide a 
precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they 
challenge.... [yvhich] must correlate all particular items of evidence with the 
challenged findings and then convince us that the trial court erred in the 
assessment of that evidence ... What appellants cannot do is merely re-argue 
the factual case they presented in the trial court....The process of marshaling 
is thus fundamentally different from that of presenting the evidence at trial. 
The challenging party must... fully embrace the adversary's position...[and] 
must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court,... and not 
attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case. . . . 
Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the 
record in support of their position.. . . Nor can they simply restate or review 
evidence that points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial 
court's finding of fact. . . . In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the 
challenging party must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the 
evidence and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the 
evidence. 
The purpose of this rigorous and strict requirement is to promote two 
interrelated court objectives: efficiency and fairness. A proper marshaling of 
the evidence promotes efficiency by avoiding "retrying the facts'1 and by 
assisting the appellate court in its "decision-making and opinion writing." It 
promotes fairness by requiring that the appellants bear the expense and time 
of marshaling the evidence rather than putting the appellee in the "precarious 
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position" of performing the appellant's work at "considerable time and 
expense." This deference to a trial court's findings is "based on and fosters the 
principle that appellants rather than appellees bear the greater burden on 
appeal." 
If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate court has grounds to 
affirm the court's findings on that basis alone. ... If appellants have failed to 
properly marshal the evidence, we assume that the evidence supports the trial 
court's findings, [citations omitted.] 
Veronica has not marshaled the evidence, but, instead ignored damaging findings, 
restated evidence favorable to her position, pointed out facts that would support findings 
contrary to the trial court's findings, and attempted to recast damaging evidence in a light 
more favorable to her position and, essentially, attempt to reargue the facts before this Court. 
A. Contracts Between Spouses Are Enforceable 
Veronica appeals the trial court's findings that Divorce Agreement is enforceable, 
without marshaling the evidence which supports the finding. Veronica does cite to trial 
testimony where, under direct examination by her counsel, she states Guenther "finalized" 
the Divorce Agreement. However, Veronica did not cite to her trial testimony on cross 
examination by Guenther's counsel that: (1) Veronica entered into the Divorce Agreement 
voluntarily; (2) Veronica never attempted to set aside the Divorce Agreement or make the 
Divorce Agreement unenforceable; (3) that prior to drafting the Divorce Agreement, 
Veronica filed on line (but not with any court) for divorce; (4) that the Divorce Agreement 
was in contemplation of a divorce; (Tr 83 L 5-25); (5) that she did not ask Guenther to sign 
the Divorce Agreement until one month after he moved out of the Terra Vista home (at her 
request), and (6) that the execution of the Divorce Agreement was to benefit Veronica 
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because she was worried Guenther would leave her for another woman (Tr 30, L 5 - 31 L 
5.) Neither did Veronica cite to her testimony that she wanted the Divorce Agreement in 
place "just in case if he decided to take off," given that Veronica needed to stay in one place 
until her child finished high school. (Tr 31 L 18- 32 L 2.) Veronica also did not cite to any 
portion of the record that disputes the trial court's findings that: (1) "the elements of the 
contract have been met;" (2) "both parties participated in drafting and revising the agreement, 
and reaching a meeting of the minds;" and (3) "[b]oth accepted legal detriments. He 
[Guenther] assumed responsibility for the mortgage, but she [Veronica] stayed on the title 
for property. She gave up the right to alimony..." (R.O.A. 481, p. 6 L 10 -15, Addendum #3.) 
Veronica also does not explain her conflicting testimony that "I never had the 
intention to divorce." (Tr 83 L 7). But she admits the Divorce Agreement was in 
contemplation of a divorce, as she had filled out, but not filed, on line forms for divorce. (Tr 
83 L 19-25.) 
Veronica has not marshaled the evidence and then demonstrated the fatal flaw in the 
trial court's decision. Thus, the trial court's ruling as to the enforceability of the Divorce 
Agreement should be affirmed. 
B. It Was Not Judicial Error to State the Rule of Law that Ambiguities in 
Contracts Should be Resolved Against the Drafter. 
Veronica next appeals the trial court's statement of contract law, that ambiguities are 
construed against the drafter of the contract. Veronica did not marshal any evidence to 
dispute this finding. Veronica did not cite to her testimony that she drafted the Divorce 
Agreement, that Guenther requested changes which were accepted by Veronica, and that the 
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Divorce Agreement itself was her idea (Tr 30 L 2-4; Tr 82 L 22 - 83 L 1; Tr 190 L 11-16). 
Guenther is unsure as to why Veronica included this as judicial error requiring correction by 
this Court. The trial court did not find any specific ambiguities in the contact. There was 
disputed testimony as to the date the parties divided their financial accounts, but the court 
resolved that dispute in Veronica's favor by adopting May 25,2001, the date testified to by 
Veronica. (Tr 84 L 17.) The trial court further found there was no ambiguity as to the date 
the Terra Vista home should be sold, as the Divorce Agreement clearly states that the sale 
of the home "shall take place after August 31, 2004." [emphasis added] (R.O.A. 394, p. 7, 
L 21-8 L 7, Addendum #1.) Veronica did not marshal the evidence as to this issue, and, in 
fact, admits "the court did not note ambiguity in its interpretation of the contract." (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 21, para. 4. Veronica did not marshal the evidence and then demonstrate the 
fatal flaw in the trial court's ruling, that any ambiguities would be construed against the 
drafter of the Divorce Agreement. The finding of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Neither did Veronica marshal the evidence as to an abuse of discretion regarding the 
fact that the Terra Vista home was not sold in August 2004. The facts in this case are similar 
to Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, in which this Court found it was not judicial error 
when the trial court did not enforce the parties' stipulation to immediately sell their 
residence. In Jensen, this Court found the "decision to reject or modify a stipulation related 
to a property division in a divorce proceeding is reviewed for abuse of discretion." See, also, 
Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 1983). Again, Veronica failed to marshal the 
evidence as to any abuse of discretion by the trial court in resolving ambiguities against 
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Veronica as the drafter of the Divorce Agreement. Thus, this Court should assume the record 
supports those findings. 
HI. VERONICA FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF THE 
PARTIES' FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS. 
A. Award of Extra Payments to Retire Mortgage 
Veronica failed to marshal the evidence related to the trial court's award to Guenther 
of payments toward the Terra Vista mortgage from his separate monies and inheritance. 
Veronica did not cite the portions of the record that were damaging to her case, highlighted 
only the facts that were favorable to her position, and merely reargued her position at trial 
before this Court. Veronica alleges in her Brief that her primary reason for giving up 
alimony was for the equity in the Terra Vista home of $70,000.00 or one-half of the equity 
when the home was sold, whichever was greater, but fails to cite to the record as to how she 
preserved this issue for appeal.l Veronica fails to cite to the record her testimony: (1) that she 
wanted Guenther to sign the Divorce Agreement primarily to insure she and her son would 
be able to live in the Terra Vista home (without any obligation that she pay the mortgage, 
property taxes or insurance); (2) because of her fear that Guenther would leave her for 
another woman; (3) and to make Guenther be nicer to her. The parties had been married for 
four years only when Veronica asked Guenther to sign the Divorce Agreement (which 
guaranteed Veronica, or her son, would receive a monthly benefit of $1,624.41 (Tr 176 L 
*(Tr 3 L 15 thru 4 L 22); (2) the issue of fault in determining an alimony award (Tr 13 L 
18 thru 22); (3)the result of a hearing regarding a request for temporary alimony, which was 
denied Tr 61 L 4 thru 63 L 15); (4)Veronica's need for alimony (Tr 76 L 17); and (5) the fact that 
there was no claim for alimony in Veronica's original petition for divorce (Tr 188 L 7 thru 13) 
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2-3) for thirty-nine months. (From August 2004, through August 2006, either Veronica or 
her son received the monthly benefit of residing in the Terra Vista home without an 
obligation to pay the mortgage or property taxes or insurance thereon. This included the 
period of August 2005 through February 2006, when Veronica had quit her job in Hong 
Kong and was unemployed in Utah.) Veronica continued to stay at the Terra Vista home, 
without any contribution for utilities, maintenance and other living expenses, after she 
obtained employment until the home was sold in August, 2006. Veronica has not marshaled 
the evidence or demonstrated a fatal flaw in the trial court's finding that the Divorce 
Agreement was enforceable, especially in light of the benefits received by Veronica as a 
result of the Divorce Agreement. 
Veronica also has not marshaled the evidence as to her claim that the trial court erred 
in awarding Guenther an offset for the payments made toward the Terra Vista mortgage from 
his inheritance (approximately $45,000.00) and his monies from his employment, after the 
parties separated their financial accounts, while Veronica was in Hong Kong. Veronica did 
state that at the time of trial, Guenther admitted that equity in the Terra Vista home included 
monies from inheritance, but omitted Guenther5 s testimony that there was no inheritance at 
the time the Divorce Agreement was signed (Tr 195 L 7-11). However, Veronica's claim 
that the Divorce Agreement reflects Guenther would pay off the Terra Vista mortgage and 
the parties would divide the equity upon the sale of the home is incorrect. The Divorce 
Agreement is clear that "[ajfter August 2004, mortgage and equity loan payments will be 
shared in the ration of actual gross income." (Exhibit B to Appellant's Brief, para. 4.) 
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Veronica's claim that the monies were gifted to her is also not supported by the record 
or the trial court's findings. Veronica chose not to cite the facts that support the ruling by 
the trial court: (1) Veronica testified there was no gift letter (Tr 120 L 4-9); and (2) the trial 
court found that leaving the parties' names on each other's account was primarily a 
convenience to Petitioner (R.O.A. 481, p. 13 L 19- 20, Addendum #3). Veronica provided 
no evidence to set aside the trial court's rejection of her contention that "his money would 
be her money, too." (Id., L 1- 2.) Additional facts supporting the trial court's ruling include: 
(1) Veronica's testimony that the parties separated their financial accounts on May 25,2001; 
(2) Veronica's testimony that she kept her annual $104,000.00 salary from her Hong Kong 
employment in her separate account; (3) Veronica's testimony that she had saved $67,000.00 
during her Hong Kong employment, which she kept in her separate account when she 
returned to Utah; (4) Guenther's payments of $45,000.00 (approximately) representing his 
inheritance are traceable; (5) the fact that Veronica paid no monies toward the Terra Vista 
mortgage after August 2004, as required by the Divorce Agreement; (6) the trial court's 
finding that the only default under the terms of the agreement was Petitioner's failure to pay 
anything on the home after she returned in August of 2005 (R.O.A. 394, p.8 L 13-18, 
Addendum #1); and (7) the fact that Veronica provided no evidence that she enhanced the 
value of the Terra Vista home after Guenther had used his inheritance payments and separate 
monies to retire the mortgage. 2 
2Veronica could have asked the trial court to calculate the credits to Guenther based on 
the percentages set forth in the Divorce Agreement. However, Veronica did not present any 
evidence as to what those calculations would have been during trial or mention an alternate 
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This Court, in Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233,217 P.3d 733 (UT App. 2009) 
found that inherited monies that are traceable in and out of joint accounts, do not lose their 
separate status through commingling. The Kimball Court also confirmed the requirement 
that Veronica must prove she "augmented, maintained, or protected the inherited property." 
11
 [T]rial courts making 'equitable' property division pursuant to section 30-3-5 
should . . . generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to 
that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value[.]" 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). But[c]ourts have 
considered inherited property as part of the marital estate when "the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the 
inherited or donated property, when the parties have inextricably commingled 
the property with marital property so that it has lost its separate character, or 
when the recipient spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the 
marital estate." Schaumbergv. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598,602 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990)). ..."The question of whether a gift or inheritance has remained 
separate is highly fact intensive and the trial court is in the best position to 
weigh the evidence and make that determination." Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker. 2008 UT App 11, P 29, 176 P.3d 476. 
Veronica has not marshaled the evidence that it was judicial error or an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to award Guenther the full value of his separate payments to 
retire the Terra Vista mortgage. The award by the trial court of $230,000.00 (approximately) 
to Guenther, representing his inheritance and/or separate payments, should be affirmed. 
B. Award of Escrow Interest 
Veronica, once again, selected only the facts which support her position in arguing 
that it was judicial error to award Guenther the interest which accrued on the account which 
(note2cont
'
d)
 calculation for Guenther's overpayment in her post-trial motions. As such the issue was 
not preserved for appeal and is not before this court. 
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held the proceeds from the sale of the Terra Vista home. The most important being the funds 
were not distributed until over two years after the trial, matter pursuant to the trial court's 
ruling on Petitioner's Rule 59 motions, Rule 60 Motion, Respondent's Motion to Enforce 
Judgment and Petitioner's Motion to Stay Enforcement and Waive Bond. (Addendum #1). 
Veronica focuses on the fact that the e-mail in which she agreed Guenther could have 
all of the interest from the escrow account was not presented at trial. However, Veronica did 
not cite to the record, which clearly indicates both parties submitted additional information 
to the trial court after the trial in this matter as to the division of the interest in the escrow 
account. In the post-trial motions, Guenther argued that: (1) Veronica refused to file joint 
tax returns, as previously ordered by the court and pursuant to the Divorce Agreement; (2) 
Guenther had to declare the interest as income on his state and federal tax filing; and (3) 
Guenther had to pay taxes on the interest income at the higher rate of married, filing 
separately. (R.O.A. 453, Addendum #5.) Veronica provided no response to the interest 
income issue in her Reply in Response to Respondent's Response. (R.O.A. 463, Addendum 
#6.) 
Veronica has failed to marshal the evidence that the trial court abused its discretion 
in awarding the interest income from the escrow account to the party who declared that 
interest. The award to Guenther by the trial court of the interest in the escrow account should 
be affirmed. 
C. Date of Division of Financial Accounts 
Although there are multiple discussions as to the date the parties' financial accounts 
Page 21 of 29 
were divided, it is undisputed that Veronica testified she separated her own accounts May 
25, 2001, and that she kept her money separate from that day forward. There was no 
evidence provided to dispute Veronica's testimony. Guenther did testify as to different dates 
he believed should have been used for the division of the financial accounts. However, 
Guenther never produced the e-mail (R.O.A. 465, Addendum #6) and, despite her ability to 
still access the joint accounts, as they could not be closed without her signature (Tr 144 L 10 
- 13), Veronica never produced the bank statements at trial. Veronica had access to the 
information she alleges would disprove her testimony at the time she requested a new trial 
and/or that the trial court obtain the statements to insure the accounts were divided on May 
25, 2001. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Veronica's request, 
given her inaction. 
The bank statements are not newly discovered evidence relating to the facts as they 
existed at the time of trial. See, In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 
1983);. In re S.R., 735 P.2d 53 (Utah 1987); Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183 
(Utah 1990). Rule 59 and applicable case law require that "the moving party show that 
ordinary prudence was exercised to guard against the accident or surprise." Powers v. Gene's 
Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977). All that was required to meet this "ordinary 
prudence standard" was for Veronica to request copies of the statements from the financial 
institution or from Guenther, using standard discovery, at any time during the fifteen months 
from the time she received Guenther's Answer and Counterclaim and the date of trial in this 
matter. 
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There was no abuse of discretion in not reopening the case to allow the 
plaintiff to present evidence on the debts. In the first place, the trial was not 
held until fourteen months after the plaintiff had filed her complaint, and the 
plaintiff had that time to conduct her discovery. 
Race v. Race. 740 P.2d 253 (Utah 1987). 
Veronica failed to marshal the evidence that the trial court erred in its determination 
of the date the financial accounts were divided or in refusing her motion that the trial court 
allow a new trial, based on documents which existed at the time, and were available to 
Veronica. The ruling of the trial court as to the division of the financial accounts and 
Veronica's post trial motions should be affirmed. 
IV. VERONICA FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF or MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE, TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS AS AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION, IN THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF THE REMAINDER 
OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
A. Failure to Brief the Issue of Value of Personal Property (Automobile and 
Furnishings.) 
Veronica does cite to the record as to the values submitted to the trial court of both 
the "Major Household Items" and the 2002 VW Golf, but cites no case law which supports 
her position that the trial court abused its discretion is valuing those items. 
Should this Court consider Veronica's cite to Mortensen (''trial court has wide 
discretion in property division, and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an 
abuse of discretion can be demonstrated") as adequate briefing of the issue. 
B. Failure to Marshal the Evidence. 
Veronica chose not to cite the findings which support the trial court's valuation of the 
personal property: (1) the only evidence presented at trial was the purchase price of the 
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furnishings; (2) no appraisals establishing present value were provided to the trial court, nor 
was the trial court offered any other method by which it could reasonably determine present 
value; (3) the parties did identify the purchase price of the disputed items; (4) neither party 
presented evidence of the vehicle's original price (FOF/COL, page 6, para. C and page 7); 
(5) the only evidence before the trial court of the value of the car is the value listed by 
petitioner [Veronica] and adopted by the respondent [Guenther] somewhere in excess of 
$ 10,000 (as the value at the time Veronica filed her Petition for Divorce); (6) the vehicle will 
not be valued as new; (7) the Court rejects respondent's [Guenther's] claim for a different 
distribution of value, making petitioner [Veronica] carry a greater share of the cost of the 
dining room set; and (8) everything is marital property and the value is to be shared half and 
half. (R.O.A. 394, p. 18, L 21- 20 L 6, Addendum #2) 
. . . the trial court may, in the exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital 
asset at some time other than the time the decree is entered," such as at 
separation. Thomas v. Thomas. 987 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoting Andersen v. Andersen. 757 P.2d 476,479 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). See 
Marshall v. Marshall. 915 P.2d 508, 516 n.14 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App. 30, 996 P.2d 565 (UT App. 2000). In addition, the trial 
court specifically set forth the "exceptional circumstances that overcome the general 
presumption that marital property be divided equally between the parties." Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker. 2008 UT App 11; 176 P.3d 476 (UT App. 2008). 
As Veronica has failed to marshal the evidence that the trial court abused its discretion 
in the valuation of the marital property, ruling of the trial court should be affirmed. 
V. VERONICA FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF HER REQUEST FOR A 
REVIEW OF ATTORNEY'S FEES or MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT 
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THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN LIMITING THE 
AMOUNT OF FEES AWARDED TO HER. 
The last line of Veronica's paragraph discussing attorney's fees requests "[i]n 
addition, the trial court should reassess the amount of its fee award in light of additional areas 
of success as a result of this appeal." The trial court did discuss the fact that Veronica 
prevailed on only one issue (the designation of Guenther's pre-marital interest in the Keams 
home as a marital assets) in concluding that Veronica should be awarded $2,500.00 for 
attorney's fees. Veronica failed to provide any reference to the record on appeal or case law 
which support her opinion that attorney's fees in a divorce matter are awarded solely on the 
basis of which party prevails. 
"The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in 
the sound discretion of the trial court." Kellev v. Kelley. 2000 UT App 236, 
P30, 9 P.3d 171 (quotations and citation omitted). Still, in awarding attorney 
fees, the trial court must consider "the receiving spouse's financial need, the 
payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Id 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
Wall v Wall 2007 UT App 67; 157 P.3d 341, cert, denied. 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007) . 
Veronica failed to cite to the findings where the trial court considered the "Jones '"factors of 
Veronica's need and Guenther's ability to pay (R.O.A. 394, p. 21, L 1-9, Addendum #2). 
Veronica failed to cite to the trial court's findings regarding the absence of reasonableness 
of her attorney's fees (IdL, L 10-21). Veronica failed to cite to the trial court's findings that 
her fees were deliberately limited due to: (1) her knowing and willful violation of the order 
of the Court not to dissipate assets; (2) Veronica's actions being contemptuous; and (3) that 
Veronica did not come to this court with clean hands. As such, the trial court found Veronica 
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was not entitled to a greater reward (Id., L 7-16). 
A trial court has "broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable 
fee." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (quoting Dixie \ 
764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988)). Such discretion is granted because the trial 
court "is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the quality and 
efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the litigation." Id. at 317 
(quotations and citation omitted). Thus, a trial court's calculation of a 
reasonable attorney fee "will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of 
a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988. 
Colleli v. Colleli. 2004 UT App 318; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 334. Veronica has failed to 
adequately brief her request for a review of attorney's fees or to marshal the evidence and 
show a fatal flaw in the trial courts determination as to her reasonable attorney's fees. The 
ruling of the trial court as to attorney's fees should be affirmed. 
Veronica failed to cite to the fact that Guenther was also awarded attorney's fees 
incurred as a result of bringing Veronica's actions to the trial court's attention. (F OF/COL, 
para. 30; pp. 23-24.) Veronica's failure to marshal the evidence as required by Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9) has shifted the burden and cost of the appeal from Veronica as the appellant to 
Guenther as the appellee, in direct contradiction of the purpose of the marshaling 
requirement. 
Generally, when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the party 
who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that 
party on appeal. 
Leppert v. Leppert. 2009 UT App 10, f29, 200 P.3d 223 (citation omitted). The standard 
of review is, again, abuse of discretion. " . . . a trial court's calculation of a reasonable 
attorney fee 'will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of 
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discretion.'" Colleli v. Collell 2004 UT App 318, citing Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 988. 
CONCLUSION 
Veronica has not marshaled the evidence and has not demonstrated the fatal flaw in 
the trial court's ruling that: (1) the Divorce Agreement is enforceable, and that the only 
default under the Divorce Agreement was Petitioner's; (2) the trial court abused its discretion 
in the valuation and/or division of the marital estate; (3) the trial court abused its discretion 
in determining the parties separated their financial accounts on May 25, 2001; (4) the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding Guenther 100% of the extra principal payments he 
made to retire the mortgage from his separate funds; (5) there was performance on the 
Divorce Agreement by the parties; (6) the trial court abused its discretion as to the value of 
the furniture and automobile awarded to Veronica; or (7) the trial court abused its discretion 
as to the amount of attorney's fees awarded to Veronica. 
As such, this Court should defer to the "trial court's pre-eminent role as fact-finder" 
and 'take the trial court's findings of fact as [the] starting point." Neeley v. Bennett, 2002 
UT App 189, para. 12, 51 P.3d 724, cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). See, also, Chen 
v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100, P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004), stating "[w]ithout proper marshaling 
of the evidence, we refuse to set aside the ruling of the trial court or the findings upon which 
it is based." The ruling of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Guenther should be awarded his attorney's fees and costs on appeal, as he was 
awarded fees by the trial court and Veronica's clear failure to follow the Utah Rules of 
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Appeal's the marshaling requirement, which shifted the burden and cost of the appeal from 
Veronica to Guenther. 
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ADDENDUM T 
•WffiSKa 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 19, 2008 this Court entered extensive Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
following a divorce trial held in 2007.l In its decision and order, the Court directed Respondent's 
counsel to "prepare and promptly file a Decree of Divorce" consistent with the Court's Findings 
of Fact/Conclusions of Law. Respondent timely prepared and filed a proposed Decree, and 
provided a copy to Petitioner's counsel. No objection to the Decree was received by the Court, 
so when Respondent filed a notice to submit for decision on August 15,2008, the Court 
reviewed the proposed Decree and signed it on August 25, 2008. 
The same day the Court signed the Decree, Petitioner filed a timely Rule 59 motion for new trial 
and to alter or amend judgment. Petitioner did not expressly identify in her motion the basis 
under Rule 59 on which she was relying. However, in her motion and supporting memorandum 
Petitioner argued that the Court had erred in at least one of its Findings and Conclusions 
(regarding date for separating bank balances), and urged the Court to "correct" its findings. 
On September 10, 2008, Petitioner filed a second (untimely) Rule 59 motion for new trial and to 
alter or amend judgment. The second motion also referenced Rule 60, but did not expressly state 
the basis (under Rule 60) supporting Petitioner's request to vacate or amend the Decree of 
!See decision of June 19, 2008 for detailed explanation for the delay between completion 
of trial and issuance of Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law. 
-1-
Divorce. In addition to rearguing her position that certain of the Court's findings were in error, 
Petitioner's second Rule 59(60) motion also complained that Respondent's counsel had not 
responded to correspondence sent by her during July 2008 concerning the proposed Decree. As 
noted, however, Petitioner did not contemporaneously communicate to the Court her objections 
or concerns with the proposed Decree. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2)("Objections to the proposed 
order shall be filed within five days after service"). In her second motion Petitioner also objected 
to the fact that her attorney had received "[n]o formal correspondence .. . that the [proposed 
Decree] was being submitted" to the Court for action. However, Rule 7(f)(2) also states that 
"jtjhe party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection 
or upon expiration of the time to object." Respondent's counsel acted consistent with the 
requirements of Rule 7. 
Respondent timely responded to both of Petitioner's motions. The first response was filed 
September 4, 2008; the second one (to the combined Rule 59/60 motion) was filed September 23, 
2008. Petitioner filed her reply ("Response to Respondent's Response ...") on September 26, 
2008; a notice to submit on the first Rule 59 motion was filed by Respondent three days later, on 
September 29th On October 6, 2008, the Court entered a brief minute entry and order denying 
Petitioner's Rule 59 motion. According to the certificate signed by the Court's clerk, a copy of 
the Court's minute entry was mailed to both counsel on October 6,2008. 
On October 15, 2008, without referencing the Court's minute entry and order, Petitioner filed a 
reply in support of her second and untimely Rule 59/60 motion, but did not file a notice to submit 
at that time. Without a notice to submit to trigger Court review, the motion remained in the file 
without a ruling. 
Nothing more happened until November 10, 2008 when Respondent filed a Motion to Enforce 
Judgment.2 In his motion Respondent noted that Petitioner had filed various post-trial motions 
that the Court had denied, but had not asked for a stay pending her appeal of the Court's 
judgment. In his Motion to Enforce Judgment Respondent argued that he was experiencing 
financial hardship because the escrow agent was refusing to release the funds. On November 24, 
2008, Petitioner, now through new counsel, filed a counter-motion asking the Court to Stay 
Enforcement and to Waive or Set Bond Pursuant to Rule 62.3 Respondent timely filed his 
Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Stay, but notices to submit the competing motions for 
2Although Respondent included argument in his motion, he did not file an accompanying 
memorandum as required by Rule 7. 
Petitioner also filed a separate Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Enforce Judgment; 
the Opposition raises identical arguments to those in Petitioner's Motion to Stay Enforcement 
and Waive Bond. 
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decision were not filed until January 13, 2009. On January 27, 2009, Petitioner also filed a 
notice to submit on her second Rule 59/60 motion. 
DISCUSSION 
Petitioner's Second fand Untimely) Rule 59 Motion 
The Court has detailed the most recent procedural history of this long-pending case because it is 
appears to the Court that Petitioner's duplicative Rule 59 motions may have caused confusion to 
both the Court and the parties regarding the posture of the case. It is unclear whether Petitioner 
received the Court's October 6, 2008 ruling on her first Rule 59 motion, because Petitioner did 
not reference the Court's ruling in her second Rule 59/60 motion or in her motion to stay 
enforcement and to waive bond. 
The Court's October 6, 2008 Minute Entry was entered in response to Petitioner's first Rule 59 
motion and Respondent's September 29, 2008 notice to submit. Admittedly, the Court's Minute 
Entry does not elaborate on the basis for the Court's decision to deny Petitioner's motion. 
However, implicit in the Court's statements in the Minute Entry (to the effect that the Court had 
reviewed the parties' submissions, its previously entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and the proposed Decree) the Court determined that Petitioner had not stated an adequate 
basis under Rule 59 for the relief she was seeking. Having already ruled once on Petitioner's 
Rule 59 motion, the Court declines to enter a second ruling on Petitioner's untimely second 
motion. 
Petitioner's Rule 60 Motion to Vacate Decree 
The Court also declines to vacate the Decree of Divorce entered August 25, 2008 because 
Petitioner's combined Rule 59/60 motion did not clearly argue any particular grounds (under R. 
60) for her request. 
Respondent's Motion to Enforce Judgment and Petitioner's counter-motion to Stay Enforcement 
and to Waive Bond 
The sale of the parties' home was completed in August 2006, but the Decree of Divorce was not 
entered until August 25, 2008. The case is under appeal. For more than two and a half years, 
proceeds from the sale of the parties' home (totaling $488,949.11) have been held in escrow. In 
its June 19,2008 decision the Court concluded that the parties' agreement to share equally the 
proceeds from the sale of the home was enforceable. As discussed by the Court in its decision, 
there would need to be various adjustments to Petitioner's share of the equity in the home to 
repay Respondent for various expenditures he had incurred with respect to the home, or to 
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compensate him for Petitioner's wrongful withdrawal or dissipation of funds belonging to 
Respondent. 
As previously noted, in his Motion to Enforce Judgment Respondent correctly noted Petitioner's 
failure to request a stay of judgment in connection with her filing of the Rule 59 motions. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 62. Only after Respondent's motion made that point did Petitioner belatedly file 
a R.62 request to stay enforcement. Not only was Petitioner's motion untimely, she offered little 
factual support for her claims. 
The sum and substance of Petitioner's argument is that Respondent is a resident alien who could 
decide at some point to return to Germany. Petitioner argues that if funds are disbursed pursuant 
to the Court's judgment and that judgment is subsequently reversed, it could be difficult to 
recoup those funds if Respondent left this jurisdiction. 
Petitioner's argument is pure conjecture. There is simply no evidence before the Court to suggest 
that Respondent is planning to leave this jurisdiction, or that even if he did, he would not 
continue to submit to the Court's jurisdiction and comply with Court orders. The track record in 
this case is that it has been Petitioner who has repeatedly violated Court orders-not Respondent. 
Absent specific facts, the Court is not inclined to give any weight to Petitioner's fears. Because 
the Court rejects Petitioner's motion, it need not reach the issue of bond setting. Had the Court 
granted the stay of judgment, however, it is not the Court's general practice to waive the bond 
requirement, and Petitioner has failed to state good cause why the Court should depart from its 
general practice. 
ORDER 
The Court declines to rule on Petitioner's second and untimely Rule 59 motion, and therefore 
DENIES the same. The Court DENIES Petitioner's Rule 60 motion to vacate judgment because 
Petitioner has failed to articulate adequate grounds for her motion. Because Petitioner has failed 
to present adequate facts to support her argument in support of a stay of enforcement, the Court 
DENIES Petitioner's motion and GRANTS Respondent's motion to enforce judgment. Based oa 
the foregoing, Petitioner's motion to waive bond is DENIED as moot. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on February 2, 2007) 
3 THE COURT: We are on the record. We are on the record 
4 on the matter of Jacobsen vs. Jacobsen, and I have — could I 
5 have Counsel state your appearances and whether you have the 
6 parties with you. 
7 MR. GREEN: John Green representing the petitioner, and 
8 the petitioner is here with me, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 MR'. SPENCER: Terry Spencer, your Honor, along with the 
11 respondent who is here, 
12 THE COURT: All right, thank you. Well, as. the parties 
13 know, we held this bench trial on January 31st of 2007. There 
14 were only two witnesses who testified; those being the parties, 
15 the petitioner and respondent. 
16 The — at the conclusion of the cross examination 
17 of respondent, which was approximately 4:30, there was a 
18 request by plaintiff's Counsel for a brief closing, or in 
19 the alternative to have closing arguments submitted in writing. 
20 I declined the offer, because I believed with the 
21 trial briefs that had been filed, and the proposed findings, as 
22 well as a day full of testimony that I had adequate information 
23 to address the matters that were placed before me. 
24 I will note for the record that there was no request 
25 to have plaintiff's Counsel — petitioner's Counsel to have his 
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1 client called back in rebuttal, but simply to address closing 
2 So I indicated that I would review my notes and the exhibits, 
3 and I would give you my oral ruling today, by way of this 
4 telephone call — means of this telephone conference. 
5 As — I guess I'll start off by saying that this is — 
6 all cases are unique, in a way, because they all have different 
7 facts; and obviously to the parties, their cases, it's the most 
8 important case, and rightly so. 
9 This case truly is unique in that it presents a number 
10 of issues about when the parties terminated their relationship, 
11 what actions they took in the process of separating that would 
12 give the Court some guidance as to how to properly and to 
13 equitably address the issues before the Court. 
14 I'm going to take this in a little bit different 
15 format, because I guess what I want to do is start out by 
16 saying that I am convinced, after reviewing all the testimony 
17 and the exhibits and the case law, that the divorce agreement 
18 drafted by the parties and signed by the parties on May 21 of 
19 2001 is an enforceable agreement. The — and will be enforced 
20 by the Court. 
21 That does not necessarily mean that I accept wholesale 
22 the scenarios opposed by respondent; and I'll address that in 
23 more specificity in a moment. First of all let me identify the 
24 facts on which I am relying for determining that this agreement 
25 is enforceable. 
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1 It was petitioner's testimony that the agreement was 
2 her idea. That the genesis of the idea came from an experience 
3 that she had had which she viewed as being a physical abuse 
4 by respondent, and certain extramarital affairs which she 
5 asserted and which he did not challenge. 
6 She acknowledged in her testimony that she had drafted 
7 the agreement, that had then given it to the respondent, who 
8 had apparently made some changes. The two of them apparently 
9 negotiated the matter, and to fi — to their satisfaction, and 
10 ultimately appeared before a notary on May 21 of 2001 to have 
11 the agreement notarized. 
12 Petitioner also testified that she did not — that 
13 while she had no specific immediate intent to implement the 
14 agreement, and was proceeding with it just in case, there is 
15 contrary — she also testified and acknowledged that she had 
16 a couple of months act — prior to the production of this 
17 agreement, had filled out paperwork for the divorce, even 
18 though the paperwork was not ultimately filed with the Court 
19 until several years later. 
20 She also indicated that she needed — because she had 
21 a child and needed a secure place for him to live until she 
22 finished — he finished high school, she had an impetus to 
23 protect that. 
24 Although neither party took specific action to file 
25 the divorce agreement, or to file actual divorce papers at that 
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1 time, I believe that this agreement was done m anticipation 
2 of a divorce, certainly within the context of that; and that 
3 as a result, the parties -- while they did not make a complete 
4 disposition of all their assets, certainly took care of 
5 addressing a'substantial number of now the majority of their 
6 financial assets. 
7 The divorce agreement is silent as to the disposition 
8 of personalty, but it does provide for the disposition of 
9 the Terra Vista home under one of two scenarios. One is an 
10 equitable division of interest when the home was sold; or if 
11 respondent chose to exercise the option of doing a payout to 
12 the petitioner by September 1 of 2004, 
13 The-agreement also provided that petitioner would 
14 have her name take off the mortgage, but she would remain on 
15 the title; and she and her son would have the right to reside 
16 in the home until August of 2004. The agreement allocated 
17 responsibility for costs and utilities and upkeep of the 
18 home, provided for the equitable distribution of pensions 
19 and retirement accounts for income tax filings and equitable 
20 distribution of tax refunds; and it expressly disclaimed any 
21 alimony. 
22 Following the signing of the agreement, there was 
23 performance on the agreement by the parties. Petitioner's name 
24 was taken off the mortgage, pursuant to the agreement. Husband 
25 responded continued making the mortgage payments, even though 
1 I he had moved out of the home in April 2001, pursuant to their 
2 agreement. 
3 The agreement had allowed petitioner to remain in the 
4 home until August of 2004. She personally moved out of the 
5 home in January of 2003, when she left for Hong Kong; but 
6 pursuant to the agreement, her son, Isaac — Isaac I believe 
7 it is — remained in the home until August of 2004. 
8 I see this as a partial stipulation regarding the 
9 disposition of most, if not all the as -- but not all the 
10 assets. The elements of the contract have been met, and 
11 that both parties participated in drafting and revising the 
12 agreement, and reaching a meeting of the minds. 
13 Bot'h accepted certain legal detriments. He assumed 
14 responsibility for mortgage, but she stayed on the title. She 
15 gave up the 'right to alimony; and there was at least partial, 
16 and frankly, in my view, almost complete performance of the 
17 agreement. The fact that the parties did not follow through 
18 with the actual filing of the divorce at the time does not take 
19 away from the enforceability of the contract. 
20 Let's see, as to the mortgage, as I already indicated, 
21 the petitioner has conceded that her name was taken off the 
22 mortgage and the equity loan for the Terra Vista home. It is 
23 also undisputed that respondent assumed responsibility for 
24 those expenses, plus the taxes on the property. 
25 While the agreement provided that he would have that 
1 
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17 
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obligation through August of 2004, after which time the parties 
apparently expected to sell the home, in reality, respondent 
continued to shoulder those expenses through mid 2006, when the 
house was finally sold. 
The agreement provided that petitioner and her son 
had the right to live at the house. In fact, petitioner did 
live with her son at the house until she left to move to Hong 
Kong in January of 2003; but since her son remained at the 
house until 2004, which by her testimony was one of the most 
significant reasons she wanted to insure that that protection 
was afforded, her interests were certainly addressed in that 
issue. 
Notwithstanding her view that it was — or her apparent 
argument that there was some kind of problem because respondent 
moved into the home after she moved to Hong Kong, given that 
the son was a minor at the time, and was by contract required 
to remain at the home until August 2004, it was entirely 
18 I appropriate that respondent would move into the house and 
19 manage the home and insure that there was no waste committed, 
20 and be maintained appropriately until the son vacated. 
21 Petitioner has argued that the house was not put up 
22 for sale in August of 2004, as contemplated, and therefore that 
23 the agreement was not performed and should not be enforced. 
24 While it is true that the house was not placed for sale as soon 
25 as initially contemplated, the contract by its express agree — 
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t occur. 
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closure, whenever that occurred. 
Additionally, item No. 4 of the agreement authorized 
petitioner to remain in the property past August 2004, until, 
quote, "until the sale was finalized, or payout was completed," 
unquote. In that event, petitioner was to pay her proportionate 
share of the. mortgage and equity loan payments on the house. 
< 
En short, the fact that the property was not sold on 
August 20> 2004 does not mandate a determination of default. 
The only default apparent under the terms of the agreement were 
— was petitioner's default, since she did not pay anything on 
the home after she returned to live at the property in August 
of 2005. 
The buyout provision of item 3.2 of the divorce 
agreement essentially provided respondent with the option to 
buy out wife by September 1, 2004, and guaranteed her a return 
of no less than $70,000 at that time. That was an option that 
was extended to the respondent, but it was not a requirement of 
performance by that date. 
It is undisputed that the parties chose not to pursue 
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1 this option, but instead took the alternative offered under 
2 item 3.1, which was that the parties would share the equity 
3 whenever the house sold. 
4 As to the filing of the tax returns, the testimony 
5 was that the parties did file joint returns for a few years 
6 pursuant to the terms of the agreement; and the undisputed 
7 testimony is 
8 that those tax refunds were split 50/50 by the parties. This 
9 is consistent with their demonstrated intent to keep their 
10 finances separate. On two occasions where there was testimony 
11 that they filed separate returns, tax returns each kept any 
12 refunds received, again consistent with the intent to keep 
13 finances separate. 
14 As to the distribution of 401-K and pension plans, the 
15 agreement expressly provided that those would be contributions 
16 made during the period of the marriage, would be divided 
17 equally; and as to alimony, petitioner expressly disclaimed 
18 her right to seek alimony. 
19 Notably, the divorce agreement makes no provision for 
20 distribution of personalty, including stock options, but that 
21 does not take away from the enforceability of the agreement. 
22 It is common for parties to enter into partial stipulations 
23 that resolve some but not all of their disputes attentive 
24 to a divorce. This agreement, in large measure, addressed 
25 distribution of assets, and is enforceable as written. 
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1 Now, let me address a few other things. As to the 
2 Kearns house -- and this all goes into the issue of things that 
3 respondent claims are premarital assets versus separate assets 
4 versus marital assets. As to the Kearns house, the issue there 
5 is whether the proceeds of that sale were marital property, or 
6 they were simply respondent's premarital property. 
7 In his testimony, respondent claimed that all of 
8 the proceeds from the sale of the Kearns house, except for 
9 approximately $4,300 or so, which he admitted was paid from the 
10 mortgage of marit — on the mortgage from marital funds, should 
11 be credited to him as premarital property, and deducted from 
12 the escrow of the accounts from the sale of the Terra Vista 
13 house. 
14 Petitioner argues that once her name was placed on the 
15 title, respondent effectively gifted her with one-half of the 
16 interest in the property; and since the money from the sale of 
17 the Kearns house eventually went to the purchase of the Terra 
18 Vista house, the funds had been so comingled as to lose their 
19 separate status as a premarital asset. 
20 At — on this issue, I must agree with petitioner. 
21 When her name went on the title for the Kearns house, she was 
22 effectively gifted with one-half of the value of that home, 
23 irrespective of the fact that respondent had paid for it in 
24 full before the marriage. 
25 Additionally, when the mortgage was taken out, it was 
I - 1 1 -
1 paid back with marital funds from the joint account into which 
2 at the time both salaries were being deposited. Then the 
3 proceeds were used towards the construction of the Terra Vista 
4 house, which was indisputably a marital asset. 
5 Therefore, I believe that the value realized from 
6 the sale of the Kearns house became marital property, to which 
7 she can properly claim one-half interest; and goes into the 
8 interest — her share of the interest in the Terra Vista house. 
9 1 There's a different conclusion as to the joint account, 
10 however. The testimony was that the parties had joint checking 
11 and savings accounts when they first married. Somehow — and 
12 there's dispute as to exactly how and why this occurred — 
13 petitioner's name became the primary name on the accounts, 
14 and the accounts were listed under her Social Security number 
15 Petitioner's testimony was that because her Social 
16 Security number was needed. Respondent says that he was not 
17 aware of that, and he only, quote, "only signed what was put 
18 in front of him." I must say that I find that last statement 
19 from respondent to not be credible. Every bit of evidence 
20 that was presented to me establishes that he kept such close 
21 rein on all things financial, to make this a believable 
22 statement to me. 
23 Initially both parties deposited money into the joint 
24 account. The salaries went through direct deposit. Also into 
25 the joint account went proceeds of the sale from petitioner's 
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home in Decader. However, the equally undisputed testimony is 
that as of May 25th of 2001, the parties separated their bank 
accounts. 
Although he remained able to access her account, and 
she similarly could access his — which was previously the 
joint account — the undisputed testimony is that at the time 
the accounts were separated in May of 2001, the money there was 
divided equally. Thereafter, her checks went into her account; 
his checks went into his account, which was previously the 
joint account. 
Petitioner never again deposited any monies into 
the joint account. Respondent paid for the mortgage, taxes, 
insurance on the home from the — his account, or the joint 
— former joint account from 2001 forward, without any 
contribution by petitioner. 
Respondent deposited his inheritance into the account 
which had become his account, which totaled approximately 
$45,000. From there, he used that money to pay off the Terra 
Vista — as partial payment towards paying off the Terra Vista 
house in full. 
Essentially petitioner claims two basis for entitlement 
to money in the joint account, which I view as his account. 
First she claims that it's because her name was still on the 
account, she had a claim to any monies that went through that 
account, regardless of source; and two, because he had promised 
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1 that essentially, quote, "his money would be her money, too." 
2 I reject those contentions. In my view, although it 
3 is true that generally all monies earned by either party during 
4 the term of the marriage and prior to separation are considered 
5 marital assets, in this case the parties signified a clear 
6 intent to separate, at least financially, in May of 2001 — to 
7 separate their finances in 2001; and their respective incomes 
8 and accounts should be treated as separate property after that 
9 date. 
10 From the date of separation of the financial accounts, 
11 petitioner no longer contributed her salary to the joint 
12 account. When she accepted the position in Hong Kong, she 
13 opened other accounts, where she deposited all of her salary 
14 and living allowance. None of that money was shared with the 
15 respondent, other than her periodic deposits to a Utah account, 
16 solely for the purpose of having — facilitating respondent 
17 to take care of her AMEX bills and her son's private school 
18 tuition. 
19 It is clear that if they thought about it at all, the 
20 fact that the parties remained signatories on each other's 
21 accounts was primarily a convenience to petitioner. There 
22 does not appear to have been much reason for her to remain a 
23 signatory on what had previously been the joint account, and 
24 which became, in my view, his account as of May 2001. 
25 Further evidence that the parties separated their 
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1 financial dealings in May of 2001 is found in how petitioner 
2 treated her salary after that date. While she was still in 
3 Utah and working m Ogden, she deposited her check into her own 
4 separate account. From that, she paid some but not all of her 
5 living expenses, as respondent continued pursuant to the terms 
6 of the agreement, to pay the mortgage and taxes on the home 
7 that she alone occupied with her son. 
8 When she moved to Hong Kong, she again kept her 
9 salary separate, depositing it into the account that was 
10 not accessible to respondent. In addition to her salary 
11 she received a substantial living allowance, and because of 
12 reimbursable, business travel, she testified that she was able 
13 to save approximately $67,000 during the two-and-a-half years 
14 she spent in'Hong Kong. 
15 When she returned to the United States, she did not 
16 divide those savings with respondent. Rather, she drew on 
17 those funds to sustain what frankly I view as an apparently 
18 lavish living standard that was wholly inconsistent with the 
19 reality of her financial situation, which was that she was 
20 unemployed. 
21 Until she again secured employment approximately 
22 seven months after her return, respondent continued to pay 
23 for essentially all of the expenses of the household. Although 
24 it appears that petitioner went through a substantial amount of 
25 money from the savings, plus incurring substantial additional 
-15-
1 debt to provide for relatively few clearly identifiable goods 
2 or services. Primarily to provide food and other personal 
3 items for herself. 
4 When she had substantially depleted "her," unquote, 
5 savings, she incurred other significant debt, and then she took 
6 advantage of the fact that she had remained as a signatory on 
7 the joint account, and then withdrew somewhere between 30,000 
8 and a little more, $31,000 from that account, that had remained 
9 in husband's account, in respondent's account. 
10 I conclude that by the parties' course of dealing, 
11 they acknowledged that financial separation as of May 25th of 
12 2001, they intended to have those funds remain separate assets. 
13 I further conclude that in accessing respondent's account and 
14 withdrawing that money for her personal benefit, petitioner 
15 improperly took funds that were by then respondent's separate 
16 property. 
17 So I hold that from the equity in the Terra Vista 
18 house, respondent is entitled to deduct the amount of money 
19 that was improperly taken by petitioner, and that can — needs 
20 to come out prior to the division of the equity. 
21 The fix-up expenses expended by respondent, there 
22 certainly has been no challenge by petitioner about that/ and 
23 in fact, she essentially conceded in her testimony that he was 
24 entitled to those expenses being deducted from the equity that 
25 has accumulated on the house from Terra Vista. Accordingly, 
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1 respondent should be given that credit before the equity 
2 generated by the sale of the home is split. 
3 As to the respondent's claim for entitlement to 
4 reimbursement for certain loans that he assisted — or that 
5 he paid off at the time of the marriage that had been — that 
6 were debts that had been brought by petitioner, I will note 
7 that petitioner, m her direct examination, essentially 
8 conceded the point that these were her debts, and that he 
9 was entitled to repayment for those debts. 
10 Based on that admission, I am concluding that those 
11 should also be credited, those should be payments credited to 
12 respondent, .1 will note as an aside that, but for that admission 
13 and concession, and the clear fact that these were her debts 
14 that she had incurred preraaritally, and which were paid off not 
15 with her funds, but really solely with his funds, the absence 
16 of any kind of evidence of express agreement from the parties 
17 might have led to a different result in terms of the Court's 
18 analysis here. It is undisputed that petitioner conceded that 
19 these were here debts, that they were paid, and that he was 
20 entitled to reimbursement. 
21 I started out by saying that this is an unusual case 
22 in terms of identifying the separation date for purpose of 
23 valuing the assets; and respondent has posited several dates, 
24 what he calls his "three scenarios." One is as of August 2004, 
25 which is what he argues that is what the divorce agreement 
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1 provides. First, I reject that. I don't believe that that's 
2 what the divorce agreement provides for. 
3 Secondly, as of the time that petitioner left for 
4 Hong Kong in January of 2003, I also do not find that to be 
5 persuasive, because it appears to me, based on the testimony 
6 received, that even though the parties had separated their 
7 finances in 2000 — May of 2001, they did continue cohabiting 
8 through the time that petitioner left for Hong Kong. 
9 After her departure for Hong Kong and during the time 
10 that she was in Hong Kong, they continued to put themselves 
11 forward as husband and wife. They did travel together. They 
12 visited each other periodically. Petitioner came back to the 
13 states to care for respondent when he was undergoing surgery, 
14 and remained for a substantial period of time providing for 
15 his care. They, in short, evidenced a continuing relationship 
16 that certainly transcends January of 2003. So I reject that 
17 scenario for that reason; and then the third scenario is as of 
18 the time of the divorce trial or the divorce decree. 
19 I do note that notwithstanding those scenarios, he 
20 does argue, and she does not dispute, that the parties had 
21 separated the financial accounts. Both parties in their 
22 submissions have acknowledged that the default position of 
23 the law for valuing marital assets under the case law is as 
24 of the date of the divorce trial and decree. It is also clear 
25 from the case law that the Court has discretion to select 
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1 other dates for valuation, taking into account the unique 
2 circumstances of each case; and provided that adequate findings 
3 are made to support alternative dates chosen. 
4 As I indicated, this case is unique, and so the 
5 Court's approach is similarly unique. I conclude that 
6 different dates need to be attached to valuing different 
7 assets. I expressly reject the wholesale adoption proffer 
8 of respondent's scenarios. However, I do draw upon facts 
9 presented in conjunction with that testimony that was received 
10 about those scenarios in reaching my determination. 
11 So as to the separation of the checking and savings 
12 account, I hold that the date of separation of those accounts 
13 is May 25, 2001. Thereafter, the monies held in the respective 
14 accounts were separate property of the parties and were treated 
15 as such by the parties, and intended as such by the parties. 
16 Valuation of the Terra Vista home — house should be 
17 as of the date of sale. That is the date that was contemplated 
18 by the divorce agreement that was negotiated by the parties. 
19 As to the valuation of the personalty, the cars, the furniture, 
20 here I am not including stock options. 
21 Let me deal first with the car. The only evidence 
22 before me of the value of the car is the value listed by the 
23 petitioner and adopted by the respondent, somewhere in excess 
24 of $10,000. Neither party has provided the Court with evidence 
25 of the original price, or has provided the Court with any 
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1 information about the source of -- or sworn testimony as to the 
2 source of funds that paid for the car payments, or how those 
3 divided. 
4 Absent any other basis for evaluating the cars' value, 
5 the Court adopts the amount that the Courts — that the parties 
6 have offered. That is, the 10,000 — whatever amount that 
7 was put forward by petitioner, and adopted by respondent- I 
8 declare that car to be marital property, subject to equitable 
9 division, 50/50 split of the value reported in the petitioner's 
10 declaration. 
11 As to the furnishings at issue, it appears that the 
12 only ones of note were the washer/dryer, the Sony TV, the 
13 dining set. . The only evidence before the Court is the value 
14 at purchase that was offered by the respondent. No other 
15 information has been provided to the Court through testimony 
16 or exhibits on which the Court can rely for assessing either 
17 the age of the items, or what kind of depreciation schedule 
18 should be used. 
19 So for that reason, the only information on which 
20 the Court can base its decision is the value at purchase, as 
21 reported by the respondent. Since petitioner has retained 
22 j those major furnishings and the car, husband/respondent is to 
23 be given credit for his one-half interest in the value of those 
24 vehi — of those items. 
25 Again, the vehicle value will not be valued as new, 
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but rather the value that has been adopted by the parties. All 
the others are the value new as reported in the exhibits. The 
Court rejects respondent's claim for a different distribution 
of value, making petitioner carry a greater share of the cost 
of the dining room set. Everything is the marital property, 
and it's the value of that is to be shared half and half. 
As to the stock options, I am going to take the 
default position that the Court and the case law provides for. 
That is, valuation as of the date of the — of the divorce, and 
the lump sum pension to be QUADRO'd. The income tax filings 
and refunds have already been divided between the parties 
equitably, or each has retained their own. So I don't believe 
< 
I need to do* anything further about that. 
Because I find that the agreement is enforceable, I 
need not reach the question of alimony, or the Jones factors 
in evaluating alimony, because it is clear that that was 
expressly — it was an entitlement or a right or a claim that 
was expressly contracted away by petitioner. 
As to attorney's fees, I note that the petition does 
not request attorney's fees, although attorney's fees have 
been requested in trial. I — since I do not find, even 
if I were inclined to give petitioner some assistance with 
attorney's fees — and I do think that some minor assistance is 
appropriate — the majority of matters, essentially petitioner 
has not prevailed on. 
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1 So I do determine, however, that respondent is m a 
2 financial position where he is able to assist, and the relative 
3 income of the petitioner and respondent are such that she has 
4 some need of assistance, and he is in a position to be able to 
5 assist her with that. Although there was no express request 
6 for attorney's fees m the petition, I believe that the statute 
7 providing for the divorce gives this Court the power to make an 
8 equitable award of attorney's fees in consideration of the fact 
9 that — well, considering all of the facts of the case. 
10 I note that petitioner has been through three separate 
11 attorneys, that there is no documentation to establish the 
12 reasonableness of those expenditures; and again, because she 
13 has not prevailed on the majority of these issues — frankly, 
14 the most significant area that she prevails on is her argument 
15 that she was .entitled to have the Kearns home be viewed as a 
16 joint marital asset — I am determining that -- am ordering 
17 that the respondent provide an assist of petitioner with $2,500 
18 towards her attorney's fees. 
19 I believe that that is a proper amount, in light of 
20 the absence of information about the reasonableness of the fees 
21 expended. I am expecting an affidavit of attorney's fees from 
22 current Counsel for petitioner; but my — the award will not 
23 be for the full amount of those amounts that would be deemed 
24 reasonable, but I believe that $2,500 should adequately address 
25 those issues. 
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1 I think that I have covered all the matters that were 
2 at issue. Have I left anything out? 
3 MR. SPENCER: This is Terry Spencer, your Honor. One 
4 item that was left out was the remove -- was the attorney's 
5 fees that went with the removal of the $30,000. That was 
6 certified by the Commissioner. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Those I am — I am going to award 
8 that I have found that the respond — that petitioner was 
9 wholly unwarranted in her actions to remove those funds; and 
10 she readily admits in her testimony that she did so. Her 
11 claims of entitlement are auspicious, as I have indicated. 
12 So not only will those amounts be returned and credited to 
13 J petitioner — I mean, to respondent prior to the division of 
14 the equity of the home, but she will be assessed the costs of 
15 the — incurred by respondent in bringing that issue to the 
16 Court. 
17 MR. SPENCER: Would you like a separate affidavit on 
18 that issue? 
19 THE COURT: Yes, please; and I will then determine 
20 the reasonableness of those fees. 
21 MR. GREEN: Your Honor, this is John Green. You 
22 indicated that the division — the division date as far as 
23 the pension was concerned was the date of the divorce. 
24 THE COURT: Correct. 
25 MR. GREEN: Is that also — that include the 401-K? 
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1 That's all pension assets. 
2 THE COURT: No, the pension. I'm sorry, let me — let 
3 me go back to the agreement. The terms of the agreement, item 
4 6, were that the 401-K pension plans of both parties for the 
5 duration of the marriage — and I am holding that that is 
6 through the divor — date of the divorce, shall be divided 
7 equally. So yes, those are to be — 
8 MR. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, and as to the stock options, let me 
10 — I believe -- I don't know if I addressed that or not. 
11 MR. GREEN: You did, your Honor. You divided those as 
12 of the date pf the decree. 
13 THE_COURT: Okay. Have I left anything else out? 
14 MR. GREEN: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
15 MR. SPENCER: I don't think so either, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. As you can see, the disadvantage I 
17 have is that I have departed dramatically from the proposed 
18 findings that were submitted. I am going to ask Mr. Spencer 
19 to prepare new findings of fact and conclusions of law in a 
20 decree that incorporates this ruling, the facts upon which I 
21 relied and any other subsidiary facts from the record that 
22 support the ruling that I have given you. 
23 MR. SPENCER: I will do that, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: And then I will look for the additional 
25 J separate affidavit of attorney's fees, and I will review that 
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1 for reasonableness and make a determination as to what — what 
2 would be appropriate at that point. 
3 MR. SPENCER Thank you, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 MR. GREEN Thank you, your Honor 
6 THE COURT. All right. 1 will then wait to hear from 
7 you, once you have reduced these to writing. Mr Spencer, 
8 please make sure that Mr. Green has the opportunity to review 
9 and approve as to form the documents. 
10 MR. SPENCER I will, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: And when — when you submit it, just out of 
12 an abundance of caution, aga^n, do submit the hard copy; but 
13 also, if we do not have Mr. Green's sign off and approval as to 
14 form, then provide me the -- with a (inaudible) or CD. 
15 MR. SPENCER: Okay. Will do, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. This telephone conference has been 
17 recorded. You can request a copy of the recording for purposes 
18 of identifying and developing the written findings. 
19 MR. SPENCER: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you very much. I hope that this 
21 allows both parties to now move on. I will add parenthetically 
22 that it is clear to me that this is a case where substantial 
23 cultural issues were present, and substantial issues as to 
24 fundamental disagreements on money management, which really is 
25 also unfortunately a very common reason why marriages fail. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MARCH 27, 2008 
JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG 
For the Petitioner: JOHN C. GREEN 
For t h e R e s p o n d e n t : TERRY C. SPENCER 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We're on the record in the matter of 
Jacobsen vs. Jacobsen and this matter is set for 11:00 but 
since you're both here, we might as well get started. If I 
could please have counsel state your appearances. 
MR. GREEN: John Green, basically representing 
myself. I filed a — 
THE COURT: I know, I ordered you to be here. 
MR. SPENCER: Terry Spencer appearing on behalf of 
the respondent. 
THE COURT: All right. This has a convoluted 
history but as you know we had the trial in this case back in 
January of last year. At the time I asked respondent to 
prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
a proposed decree, when he did. Mr. Green filed an objection 
raising some issues which I thought were legitimate, others 
which I didn't think were particularly legitimate but enough 
i 
22 ] that I wanted to give him leave to submit alternative 
23 
24 
25 
findings. Those were submitted. Frankly they were - they 
lacked a lot and so I expressly asked that those proposed 
findings be submitted in electronic form for purposes of 
1 j editing. You never did. 
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MR. GREEN: Your Honor -
THE COURT: At Least I have no record that they were 
ever received, let me put it that way. My minute entry of, 
let me see, May 21, 2007 specifically says, "Petitioner is 
directed to provide her proposed findings in electronic 
format readable by WordPerfect. 
MR. GREEN: I apologize, Your Honor. I was under 
the imprpssion that had been done. I know that was, you 
know, there was a problem at a point in time but I mean, they 
were both submitted and electronically and... 
THE COURT: Somehow I never received the electronic 
copy. So it sat there without any action, nobody ever 
contacted - the matter again. I didn't have, unfortunately 
a tickler -to remind me that we were waiting for this. When 
nothing had occurred as is my practice to maintain my case 
load current, this matter was dismissed for lack of activity 
after six months. Respondent was not sent notice of the 
dismissal because it is not the Court's practice to send 
notices to parties that are not the petitioner because after 
all typically a defendant, the party interested in 
maintaining the case is the party that had brought the suit. 
It is our practice to send notice of an intent to dismiss if 
the party on the other side has filed a counterclaim, counter 
petition. In this case respondent had not. So it was solely 
1 petitioner's motion, I mean petitioner's matter and if 
2 petitioner didn't care that the matter got dismissed then 
3 that's sort of the thinking of the court. We are examining 
4 whether we want to keep it that way but that is the practice 
5 of the courts. So that's why you received no notice of that. 
6 It was our error because we should have put it on 
7 tracking to reflect that we were waiting for final resolution 
8 of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree and I 
9 accept responsibility for that. We should have picked that 
10 up, we didn't, the case got dismissed. 
11 I So the bottom line is, there was an unresolved 
12 matter pending precipitated primarily because of the 
13 objectioas raised by Mr. Green on behalf of his client and so 
14 when Mr. Spencer brought the matter to my attention through 
15 his most "recent motions, I went back into the file and sort 
16 of refamiliarized myself with what had gone on and what had 
17 and hadn't happened. That's why I decided it was important 
18 to schedule this hearing, get us all in the room together and 
19 be able to address the issue. It seems to be clear to me 
20 that the dismissal was improvidently granted - entered 
21 because there was a pending matter that had gone to trial and 
22 we were just really waiting for the final resolution of the 
23 paperwork rather than - and so I am setting aside the 
24 dismissal. It shouldn't have ever been entered. Now — 
25 MR. SPENCER: May I make a suggestion, Your Honor? 
1 THE COURT: Certainly. 
2 I MR. SPENCER: You have findings of fact and 
3 conclusions of law by both parties. 
4 THE COURT: Correct. 
5 MR. SPENCER: Would you like both of us to submit 
6 our findings in an electronic format -
7 THE COURT: I think that would be the most useful 
8 at this point and that would allow me to - I understand that 
9 I have to get my head back into this by listening to the 
10 recording of our trial -
11 -MR. SPENCER: Of the ruling. 
12 THE COURT: And at least of the ruling and get my 
13 head back <-into it and then reexamine the two sets because I 
14 have your objections and your reasoning and that objection. 
15 So if the two of you could get that to me in electronic 
16 format, I-'think we're now to WordPerfect XIII so anything 
17 WordPerfect readable, WordPerfect 12 or higher would be -
18 MR. SPENCER: You can only read up. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah, right. Would be - then I can get 
20 that. But for now I am setting aside the dismissal because 
21 the matter is still pending resolution. I will, as soon as I 
22 I get that from the two of you, I have one other matter that I 
23 j am working on but basically your matter and that other matter 
24 are my top priorities to get those resolved and out the door 
25 and we'll get this wrapped up. 
1 i MR. SPENCER: Do you want it on a thumb drive disk, 
2 is that how the Court is (inaudible) -
3 THE COURT: You can put it that way or you can just 
4 email it to my clerk. 
5 MR. SPENCER: Okay. The email address will be the-
6 THE COURT: She can just give you her card and you 
7 can both" email it just as an attachment and she can let you 
8 know if she's received it without any difficulties and if 
9 there's a problem then we can bring it in in a CD or a thumb 
10 drive or something like, okay? 
11 MR. GREEN: And then my withdrawal basically is 
12 rejected? That's fine. 
13 THE COURT: Until the matter gets resolved. I 
14 think I need to have you both on here. 
15 MR. GREEN: No, I understand that-
16 THE COURT: At this point I think your involvement 
17 will be fairly minimal because I'm basically taking over that 
18 responsibility as soon as I get your materials and I have a 
19 chance to review the hearing results, okay? 
20 I MR. SPENCER: Okay, thank you, Your Honor. 
21 I THE COURT: All right any - so Mr. Green, your 
22 withdrawal will be granted as soon as I enter my findings, 
23 okay? 
24 MR. GREEN: Okay. 
25 THE COURT: In the meantime, I just need to have a 
6 
1 j contact person and I will feel more comfortable contacting, 
2 having my clerk contact both counsel rather than a pro se 
3 party. 
4 MR. GREEN: This makes the best sense, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So thank you both 
6 for being here and I will wait to get your email versions and 
7 I'll try to get it as quickly as possible. 
8 MR. SPENCER: Now would you just like findings of 
9 fact and conclusions of law — 
10 MR. SPENCER: Or do you want the decree? 
11 MR. GREEN: Oh you want the decree? 
12 THE COURT: Well, send me the decrees too because 
13 I'll just go ahead and finalize it. 
14 MR. SPENCER: Okay, fair enough. Thank you. 
15 THE COURT: All right. (Recording turned off and 
16 on, approximately a 10 second lapse) - a proposed decree from 
17 Mr. Spencer, which to the extent that I find that I agree 
18 with some of your objections, I can modify the decree. I 
19 don't want to run up a further bill when you're -
20 MR. GREEN: I won't charge you anything. If you'd 
21 just give me seven days to -
22 I THE COURT: Don't worry about it. What I'll do is 
23 j I'll just work off of the form that Mr. Spencer submits and 
24 I'll modify it as I need to, okay? 
25 J MR. SPENCER: Okay. (Hearing concluded) -c-
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BACKGROUND 
A bench trial was held in this case on January 31, 2007. Petitioner was present and 
represented by her counsel, John C. Green. Respondent was present and represented by his 
counsel, Terry R. Spencer. As a preliminary matter, Petitioner moved the Court for leave to 
amend her Petition to include an unconditional claim for alimony. The Court denied the belated 
motion, although it ruled that Petitioner could attempt to present a case for alimony based on 
Respondent's failure to meet conditions precedent to the waiver. The matter then proceeded to 
trial, with the parties presenting exhibits and testimony to the Court. The Court took the matter 
under advisement and scheduled a follow-up telephonic conference for February 5, 2007 at 
which time the Court announced its rulings and directed Respondent's counsel to prepare and 
submit proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law ("FF/CL"), and Decree of Divorce 
("Decree"). After Respondent submitted his proposed FF/CL, Petitioner filed an objection and 
moved the Court for leave to file her own proposed FF/CL and Decree. On May 21, 2007 the 
: Court granted Petitioner's motion after concluding that Respondent's proposed Fh'Ci did nut 
fully and accurately capture the Court's rulings. The Court directed Petitioner's counsel to file 
the submissions in electronic format to facilitate review and, as necessary, modification by the 
Court. On June 4,2007, Petitioner filed her submissions In * ^ . «*v • d- r - .* . >• 
provided. The docket reflects that on June 21, 2007, the Court's clerk renewed the request for 
an electronic copy, but none was again received. That same day Respondent filed his objections 
to Petitioner's submission. For unknown reasons, neither Petitioner's proposed submissions nor 
Respondent's objections were brought-to the Court's attention for action. 
Due to inaction in the case, after six months the Court noticed the matter for dismissal 
absent a showing of "good pause" by Petitioner. As was the Court's then practice (which has 
subsequently been modified), only counsel for Petitioner, as the party bearing the duty to 
prosecute the case, was notified of the anticipated dismissal,1 When Petitioner's counsel failed 
to respond to the dismissal notice the case was dismissed on December 6, 2007, for failure to 
prosecute. 
On February 15,2008, Petitioner's counsel filed a notice to withdraw from the 
(dismissed) case. Respondent, who was unaware that the case had been dismissed, objected 
1The Court erred when it failed to notify Respondent's counsel of the anticipated 
dismissal because Respondent had timely filed a Counterclaim and paid the appropriate fees. As 
a cross-Petitioner, Respondent should have been notified that a dismissal was being 
contemplated. 
2 
arguing that the matter was still pending final determination. After receiving Respondent's 
objection the Court held a hearing on March 27, 2008. At that hearing the Court reviewed with 
the parties the status of the case, and agreed with Respondent that the matter should not have 
been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court vacated the dismissal and again directed Petitioner's 
counsel to submit an electronic version of the proposed documents; the submissions were 
received by the Court in April 2008. The Court declined to allow counsel for Petitioner's 
withdrawal until the case was fully resolved. A notice to submit for decision was filed on May 
12, 2008. 
Having now reviewed the parties' submissions and objections the Court is fully advised 
and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Petitioner and Respondent, are husband and wife having been married in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about the 18th day of April, 1997. The parties resided in a 
marital relationship in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Petitioner has a son, Isaac, who is not an issue of this marriage. 
3. During the course of the marriage the parties have experienced irreconcilable 
differences that prevent them from pursuing a viable relationship. 
4. Petitioner filed her Petition for Divorce (the "Petition") on October 13, 2005. 
Respondent filed his Answer and a Counterclaim on October 26,2005. 
3 
Kearns House Proceeds 
5. At the time the parties married in April 1997 Respondent owned < utn '^hl d house 
located in Kearns, Utah; there was no mortgage on the property. Petitioner and her son moved 
into the Kearns house with Respondent. 
6. At some point thereafter, the parties decided to buy a lot ind build i in w house 
(which the parties called the "Tera Vista" house and which will be referred herein as the 
"Residence"). They took out a $60,000 mortgage on the Kearns house in order to secure funds to 
purchase their desired lot, which was valued at $81,000. The remaining $21,000 balance on the 
lot price was paid from marital assets-a joint account to which both parties contributed. 
7. The mortgage on the Kearns house (until the time it was sold), was paid from the 
joint account. 
8. Either prior to, or in connection with, securing the mortgage on the Kearns house, 
Respondent put Petitioner's name on the title to the Keams house as "joint tenants with right of 
survivorship." 
9. When the Keams house was sold, proceeds from that sale ($103,529.83) were 
used towards the construction of their new Residence. 
10. The parties dispute whether the proceeds from the sale of the Keams house were 
"marital" assets as Petitioner argues, or "premarital" property of Respondent, as he claims. If the 
Court iinds that the Kearns house was premarital proper! \ \)i Respondent, an additional issue is 
4 
whether Petitioner should be given credit for those payments made from marital funds. 
Respondent argues that all of the proceeds from the sale of the Keams house-except for 
approximately $4,300.00, which he acknowledges was paid on the mortgage from marital 
funds-should be credited to him as premarital property and deducted from funds placed in 
escrow following the 2006 sale of the Residence. For her part Petitioner argues that once 
Respondent placed her name on the title to the Keams house he effectively "gifted" her with one-
half interest in the property.2 Moreover, Petitioner argues that since the money from the sale of 
the Kearns house was used to purchase their new Residence, those funds have been so co-
mingled as to lose any separate status as a premarital asset. 
Dates of Separation 
11. The parties initially separated on or about May 2001. Between May 2001 and 
March 2006 the parties spent extended periods of time in separate households, but have also 
spent some together.3 For example, Petitioner relocated to Hong Kong in January 2003, but her 
Petitioner acknowledges that even if the Court accepts her position that the proceeds 
from the Residence should be equitably divided, prior to such division Respondent should be 
reimbursed or credited with certain expenses he incurred. Specifically, Petitioner testified that 
Respondent should be credited with (a) $14,417.21 he paid on her behalf to retire certain of her 
pre-marital debts, (b) maintenance and repair expenses Respondent incurred for benefit of the 
Residence (which the Court finds totaled $7,616.09), and (c) his share of a commission discount 
the parties received (one-half of a $5,200 credit). 
Respondent suggested that the Court consider various dates as the relevant "separation" 
dates in this case. First he suggests that the Court should consider either January 2003 (when 
Petitioner left for Hong Kong) or August 2004, the date contemplated in the parties' Divorce 
Agreement, as the date the parties separated. In contrast, in her Petition filed October 13,2005, 
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son remained at the house with Respondent pursuant to the terms of a "Divorce Agreement" (the 
"Agreement") the parties negotiated in February 2001 (see discussion infra). Moreover, during 
Petitioner's time in Hong Kong the parties continued to put themselves forward as husband and 
wife, they traveled and vacationed together, visited each other periodically, and Petitioner 
returned to Utah to care for Respondent when he underwent surgery; she remained here for a 
substantial period of time providing for his care. After the Petitioner returned to the United 
States from Hong Kong she lived at Lht* Residence until it was sold in August, 2006. It is not 
clear from the evidence at trial exactly when Respondent left the Residence permanently after 
Petitioner returned from Hong Kong. 
12. Among the main issues in dispute in this case are the dates the Court should use to 
fix the value of various assets for purposes of their division. Based on the testimony received at 
trial, the Court finds that several different dates of "separation" and/or "valuation" should be 
employed in adjudicating this matter: 
A. Date of separation of checking/savings accounts.4 After they married the 
parties maintained joint checking and savings accounts. Petitioner's name was 
listed as "primary" name on the accounts, and they carried her social security 
Petitioner indicated that the parties "would be separating during the pendency of the action." 
4Although the Court's notes did not reflect any discussion at trial of accounts acquired by 
the parties prior to marriage, it appears there may have been such accounts. The law is clear that 
to the extent, if at all, that the parties held such accounts and did not co-mingle them, those funds 
are the separate pre-marital property of each party. 
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number The parties dispute the reasons for this arrangement, but it is clear from 
the evidence that they viewed the accounts as joint accounts. Initially, both 
parties deposited money into the joint account; their salaries were deposited 
through direct deposit. Also into the joint account Petitioner deposited the 
approximately $7,100 received as proceeds from the sale of her home in Decatur,5 
Alabama. Respondent presented evidence (not contested by Petitioner) that the 
parties "separated" their bank accounts on or before May 25, 2001.6 Nevertheless, 
Respondent remained able to access "her" account and she, similarly, was able to 
access what became "his" account (previously their "joint" account). The 
undisputed testimony was that at the time the parties separated their accounts, all 
the money in what had been the "joint" account was divided 50/50. Thereafter, 
Petitioner's checks went into "her" account; Respondent retained the joint account 
as "his" account and his salary was deposited into that account. Petitioner never 
again deposited any moneys into that account. From May 2001 forward, 
Respondent paid for the mortgages, taxes and insurance on the Residence from his 
5Trial exhibits show that Petitioner received $5,598.66 in cash, plus a mortgage refund of 
$634.43, and a mortgage premium refund of $881.77, for a total of $7,114.86. 
6The Court's notes from trial reflect that, at different times, the parties testified that the 
division of accounts occurred in either April or May 2001. Although most of the testimony 
referenced the May 25, 2001 date, there were some references to April 13,2001 as the actual date 
the accounts were split. In any event, the parties' testimony is consistent that the parties did not 
intend to retain "joint" accounts after May 25, 2001 at the latest. 
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account without contribution from Petitioner. Respondent also deposited his 
inheritance, totaling approximately $45,000 into his account; he later used that 
money to pay off (in full) the mortgage on the Residence. Notwithstanding this 
undisputed evidence, Petitioner subsequently claimed one-half ownership in the 
funds in that account on two bases: (1) that her name was still on his account; and 
(2) that when they married Respondent had promised that "his money would be 
her money too." The Court rejects both of Petitioner's arguments and finds that 
after May 25, 2001, the parties' prior joint account became, by agreement of the 
parties, solely Respondent's account. 
Support for the Court's finding is drawn from the conduct of the parties 
subsequent to May 25, 2001. When Petitioner relocated to Hong Kong in January 
2003, she opened bank accounts into which she deposited her salary and a 
substantial living allowance. Respondent had no access to that account. By the 
time she completed 2 1/2 years in Hong Kong, Petitioner had managed to save 
approximately $67,000. When she returned to the U.S. she did not divide her 
savings with Respondent. Instead, she drew upon those funds to sustain an 
apparently lavish living standard wholly inconsistent with the reality of her 
financial situation, which was that she was unemployed. Until she again secured 
employment-approximately seven months after her return-Respondent continued 
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to pay for mortgage, upkeep, taxes, basic utilities, etc., in the Residence she was 
occupying. During that period Petitioner appears to have spent in excess of 
$30,000 from her savings and incurred substantial additional debt in order to 
provide food and other personal items for herself (Respondent was covering the 
mortgage and taxes on the Residence). The Court finds that when Petitioner had 
substantially depleted "her" savings and incurred other debt, she took advantage 
of the fact that she still had signing authority in Respondent's account (the former 
joint account) by withdrawing $29,777.29 from that account.7 Petitioner 
acknowledged at trial that none of the money she withdrew from Respondent's 
account had been contributed by her. The amount withdrawn by Petitioner 
equaled one half of the balance in Respondent's account 
Although the parties retained signing rights in each other's accounts, the 
Court finds this does not evince an intent to have the parties retain an interest in 
the other's accounts. Rather, it was either intended as a convenience to Petitioner 
(in the case of Respondent's right to access Petitioner's account) or resulted from 
inadvertence (in the case of Petitioner's right to access Respondent's account). 
When Petitioner left for Hong Kong her son remained in Utah with Respondent. 
Considering interest in the account accruing at 2.5%, the Court finds value of the 
Petitioner's withdrawal to have been $30,105.65. However, at trial Respondent waived any claim 
to interest. Therefore, only the $29,777.29 should be credited to Respondent 
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Petitioner made periodic deposits into her Utah account which Respondent could 
access so that he could pay her American Express bills and her son's private 
school tuition. There was absolutely no evidence that Respondent accessed 
Petitioner's account for his own benefit; rather, he rendered her a service by 
paying her bills. On the other hand, the Court could discern no reason why 
Petitioner remained a signatory after Respondent assumed the joint account as his 
own. The Court finds that this was mere inadvertence by the parties and not 
intended to convey any right to Petitioner to access the funds in Respondent's 
account. As noted earlier, the parties had previously divided the funds in that 
account evenly, and Petitioner had received her share of those moneys. Therefore, 
the Court finds that Petitioner wrongfully withdrew these moneys from 
Respondent's account. Petitioner should be required to return those funds in full 
by having her share of the equity in the Residence reduced by $29,777.29. 
B. Date for valuation of the Residence. The Residence was sold on or about 
August, 2006, and resulted in net proceeds of $488,949.11. Those proceeds have 
been placed in escrow pending resolution of the issues between the parties. 
Valuation date for the Residence should be as of the date of sale. This is 
consistent with the date contemplated by the parties' negotiated Agreement (see 
discussion below). 
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After the parties separated their financial accounts in May 2001, Respondent 
made extra payments on the Residence. Those payments were made from moneys 
received by Respondent as bonuses, incentive pay, and/or an inheritance. 
Through those payments (made by Respondent between June 2003 and June 
2005), Respondent was able to retire the mortgage on the Residence 
(approximately $230,000). He should be credited with the full value of those 
extra payments before equity in the Residence is allocated to the parties. 
C. Date for valuation of personalty (excluding stock options). As to 
household furnishings, the parties do not dispute these are marital assets^ . The 
only evidence presented at trial was the purchase price of the furnishings. No 
appraisals establishing present value were provided to the Court, nor was the 
Court offered any other method by which it could reasonably determine present 
value. At trial, however, the parties did identify the purchase price of the disputed 
items. Absent any other measure of present value, the Court adopts the cost of the 
furnishings at time of purchase (as identified by the parties), and fmds that they 
should share that value on a 50/50 basis. Since Petitioner retained the major 
furnishings at issue (i.e., the washer and dryer, a Sony TV, a dining set), it is fair 
and reasonable that Respondent be given credit for his one-half interest in each of 
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those items, and that after assets are divided, Respondent's one-half interest be 
subtracted from Petitioner's share of the equity being held in escrow. 
As to the value of the 2002 VW Golf, the only evidence presented to the Court 
was the value listed by Petitioner in her December 2005 financial declaration. At 
trial, Respondent also adopted the value reported by Petitioner as an appropriate 
measure of the vehicle's value. Neither party provided evidence of the vehicle's 
original price, nor of the source of funds used to pay on the car loan prior to the 
time Petitioner left for Hong Kong. After Petitioner relocated overseas, 
Respondent made the loan payments on the vehicle from his funds. At a 
minimum, it appears that both parties contributed to the vehicle's purchase, 
maintenance, and operation. The Court finds that the VW Golf is marital 
property subject to equitable division based on the value reported in Petitioner's 
financial declaration. Since Petitioner retained the vehicle, Respondent should be 
given credit for his one-half interest in the reported value thereof. Respondent 
should be reimbursed for his half-interest from Petitioner's share of the equity in 
escrow. 
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D. Date of valuation of stock options. Respondent accumulated stock options 
during the term of the marriage. Those options should be valued as of the date of 
the divorce trial,8 and equitably divided between the parties. 
E. Date for valuation of pensions/40 IK plans, etc. Both parties participated 
in defined contribution retirement accounts during the term of their marriage. 
Additionally, Respondent participated in a defined benefit retirement account. 
Pursuant to the parties' negotiated Agreement, they agreed to divide those 
amounts equally. During her trial testimony Petitioner acknowledged that 
Respondent is entitled to one-half of the amounts she accumulated towards 
retirement during the time she was in Hong Kong. The Court finds that all the 
pensions, retirement plans, and 40IK plans accumulated by the parties from date 
8In the usual case, the date of trial is in reasonably close proximity to the time the Divorce 
Decree enters so that it is often used as a proxy valuation date for the "end of marriage" date. In 
this case, however, more than 18 months will have lapsed between the trial date and the date the 
Decree will finally be entered. Neither the parties nor the Court anticipated this protracted delay. 
Because it is clear that the parties expected the divorce trial to bring finality to their relationship, 
the Court believes that is the appropriate date to use for valuation, rather than the date when the 
Divorce Decree is actually entered. In doing so the Court acknowledges that there may have 
been significant fluctuation in the value of certain assets during the intervening period, but such 
fluctuation would largely be attributable to market forces rather than to the actions of the parties. 
Therefore, the Court believes neither party will be disadvantaged by adopting the date of trial as 
the valuation date. 
13 
of marriage to the date of trial5 should be equitably divided between the parties, 
and distributed pursuant to Qualified Domestic Relations Orders ("QDROs"). 
Sometime in 2006, Respondent removed funds from his 40IK account in 
the amount of $68,829.64. Because of Respondent's actions, those funds are no 
longer available for distribution through a QDRO. The Court finds those funds 
were marita] property subject to equitable division as of the date of trial. 
Petitioner is to be credited with one-half of this amount, which should be drawn 
from Respondent's share of the equity in escrow. Similarly, Petitioner apparently 
"cashed out" certain retirement funds totaling approximately $12,000, including 
some retirement benefits accumulated during her time in Hong Kong. The Court 
finds those accounts to have also been marital funds; Respondent apparently did 
not receive his equal share of those funds. To the extent Petitioner may have 
accessed such funds, Respondent is entitled to one-half thereof, to be drawn from 
Petitioner's share of the funds in escrow. 
Enforceablitv of "Divorce Agreement" 
9
 Although it is likely that the value of those pensions/retirement/40lK accounts also 
fluctuated due to market forces, the parties' own contributions (or those of their employers) to 
those accounts have also played a role in their present value. Given that the parties anticipated 
that their relationship would terminate shortly after the divorce trial, the Court also sets the date 
of trial as the time for valuing the pensions/retirement/401K accounts. To select the date of entry 
of the Divorce Decree, as suggested by Petitioner, would mean that the parties would be entitled 
to funds contributed by or on behalf of the other spouse long after the parties intended their 
relationship to terminate. 
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13. On or about February 2001 the parties were experiencing marital difficulties. 
At about that time Petitioner down-loaded, and partially completed, the on-line forms provided 
by the courts to assist pro se parties to petition for divorce. The pro se Petition was never filed, 
but shortly thereafter the parties negotiated and entered into a written Agreement (the previously 
referenced "Divorce Agreement"). Petitioner initially drafted the Agreement and provided it to 
Respondent. He, in turn, proposed certain changes. After further negotiations Petitioner 
produced a final version, which the parties signed on May 14, 2001 before a notary public.10 
The Court finds that the parties generated the Agreement in contemplation of a divorce 
proceeding to be filed thereafter. 
14. The parties' Agreement covered the following issues: 
A. The mortgage on the Residence. 
B. Who would live at the Residence. 
C. The sale of the Residence". 
D. Respondent's ability to "buy-out" Petitioner's interest in the Residence. 
E. The filing of tax returns and the distribution of any tax refunds until the 
Decree was entered. 
F. The distribution of 401K and pension plans. 
10Petitioner testified that after the parties signed of the Agreement she did not 
immediately pursue divorce proceedings and the parties "never again" discussed the Agreement. 
Petitioner testified she gave Respondent her copy of the Agreement when she left for Hong 
Kong. 
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G. Alimony. 
15. The Agreement was silent as to disposition of personalty, including stock options 
accruing during the parties' marriage. 
16. With respect to each of the issues referenced at ^ [14, the Agreement provided as 
follows: 
A. Respondent would be responsible for paying the mortgage on the 
Residence, but Petitioner would remain on the title. 
B. Petitioner and her son, Isaac, would have a continuing right to reside in the 
home until August 2004, and would be responsible for the cost of utilities and 
upkeep of the home during that occupancy period. 
C. The Residence would be sold "after August 31, 2004"; however, the 
Agreement did not specify a date by which the sale would be completed. 
D. Respondent would have the option to buy out Petitioner's interest by 
September 1,2004. If he did so, Petitioner was guaranteed a return of not less 
than $70,000. Alternatively, the Agreement provided that the parties would share 
the equity whenever the Residence was sold. 
E. The parties would continue to file joint tax returns, and would share on a 
50/50 basis any tax refunds received. 
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F. The contributions made by the parties to their pensions and/or retirement 
accounts during the term of the marriage would be divided equally. 
G. Petitioner would not seek alimony. 
In partial fulfillment of the terms of the Agreement, the parties performed as 
A. Respondent assumed full responsibility for the mortgage and Petitioner's 
name was removed from that obligation. Respondent continued to pay the 
mortgage on the Residence from the time the parties entered into the Agreement 
until the mortgage on the Residence was paid off by Respondent in June 2005. 
Nevertheless, Petitioner's name remained on the title to the Residence until it was 
sold on or about the Summer, 2006. 
B. Respondent moved out of the Residence on April 14, 2001. Petitioner 
remained at the Residence until January 2003, when she left to work in Hong 
Kong, China. At that point, Respondent moved back into the Residence and 
assumed responsibility for its maintenance. Petitioner's son, Isaac, remained at 
the Residence living with, and under the care of, Respondent until after he 
completed high school. Isaac moved out of the Residence in August 2004. 
C Of the two options available under the Agreement whereby Respondent 
could address/purchase Petitioner's interest in the Residence, the Court finds that 
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Respondent chose the option by which the parties would share equally the equity 
in the Residence once it was sold.11 
D. For most years after entering the Agreement the parties filed joint tax 
returns and divided their tax refunds equally. On the two occasions they filed 
separate tax returns, they each kept any refunds received. 
18. Petitioner now argues that she should not be held to the provisions of the 
Agreement-and, in particular, to her disclaimer of alimony-because there was a failure of a 
"condition precedent" to its enforceability. Petitioner argues that the Agreement required that the 
house be sold by August 2004 and that she be paid her $70,000 in equity by September 1,2004. 
Since those actions did not occur by the identified deadlines, Petitioner claims the Agreement 
does not bar her alimony claim. For the reasons given below as part of the Court's Conclusions 
of Law, Petitioner's argument is categorically rejected. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
19. The jurisdictional requirements for granting the requested Decree have been met. 
20. Petitioner should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, with the same to become final upon signing and entry. 
1
 Paragraph 3 of the Divorce Agreement gave Respondent two options: Under paragraph 
3.1, the parties could share equally in the equity of the home. Under paragraph 3.2, Respondent 
could buy out Petitioner's interest in the Residence by paying her no less than $70,000.00 by 
September 1,2004. 
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Keams House Proceeds 
21. When Respondent placed Petitioner's name on the title to the Keams house, he 
effectively gifted Petitioner with one-half of the value of that home, irrespective of the fact that 
he had paid for it in full before the marriage. No evidence was presented identifying exactly 
when Respondent took this action, or the reasons for why he did so. No evidence was presented 
to suggest that Petitioner's name on the title on the Kearns house was a necessary prerequisite for 
securing the mortgage to purchase another building lot. After the mortgage on the Keams house 
was secured, the evidence indicates that the parties paid that obligation with funds from the joint 
account into which both of their salaries were deposited. When the Keams house was sold the 
proceeds were used by the parties to build their new marital Residence. The Court concludes 
that through gifting and co-mingling of funds used to pay the mortgage, the Kearns house lost its 
character as Respondent's premarital property. Therefore, the Court concludes that the proceeds 
realized from the sale of the Kearns house became a marital asset which was subsequently 
reinvested in the Residence-another marital asset. 
Enforceability of Divorce Agreement 
22. The Court concludes that the Agreement drafted by Petitioner, with modifications 
provided by Respondent, is an enforceable contract entered into by the parties in contemplation 
of divorce. The Court concludes that the Agreement is, in essence, a partial stipulation regarding 
the disposition of most, but not all, the parties' assets. Furthermore, the Court concludes that the 
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elements of contract have been met: both parties participated in the drafting and revising of the 
Agreement, ultimately reaching a "meeting of the minds" as to the terms found therein. Both 
parties accepted certain legal detriments (Respondent assumed responsibility for the mortgage on 
'the Residence, but Petitioner remained on the title; Petitioner gave up the right to alimony), and 
there was at least partial performance by the parties. Moreover, because Petitioner essentially 
drafted the Agreement, any ambiguity therein should be resolved against her, as she was in the 
best position to ensure her concerns were addressed. The fact that the parties did not timely 
follow-through with the contemplated divorce at or about the time they signed the Agreement 
does not diminish the Court's conclusion that it is an enforceable contract. There is more than 
adequate evidence to support the Court's determination that the parties knowingly negotiated 
their Agreement intending to be bound thereby. They also performed in a manner consistent with 
their understandings of the Agreement. The Court finds Petitioner's "failure of condition 
precedent" argument to have no merit. By its terms the Agreement did not require the sale of the 
home by a date certain-it merely indicated the earliest date by when the Residence would be 
offered for sale. The Agreement also gave Respondent the option of how to satisfy Petitioner's 
claim to equity in the Residence: either by a payment of $70,000 by September 1, 2004, or by 
dividing the equity when the Residence actually sold. Since the Residence did not sell as early as 
the parties may have hoped, Respondent was foreclosed from exercising the first option. When 
the Residence did sell in 2006, the proceeds were placed in escrow awaiting equitable division. 
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The Court concludes there were no "conditions precedent" to the enforceability of the 
Agreement. Furthermore, there is no evidence that either party was subjected to undue pressure 
or duress by the other in negotiating their Agreement. In short, the Agreement is valid, 
enforceable, and its terms are binding on the parties. 
23. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner knowingly and intelligently 
waived any claim to alimony in the Agreement, and is therefore foreclosed from seeking relief 
from that provision of the Agreement.12 Because Petitioner is bound to the terms of the 
Agreement, including the express disclaimer as to alimony, the Court need not analyze that issue 
further under the Jones v. Jones factors. 
Financial Issues 
24. Separation of accounts. Based on the evidence received at trial the Court has 
found that the parties intended to, and in fact did, separate their checking and savings accounts by 
May 25, 2001 at the latest. Thereafter, the funds placed into their respective accounts became 
their separate property. Thus, notwithstanding her signing authority, Petitioner had no 
entitlement to the funds she withdrew from Respondent's account (the former joint account) in 
2006. Similarly, Respondent had no entitlement to funds placed in Petitioner's separate accounts 
after that date. The monies improperly removed by Petitioner from Respondent's account, 
12
 Indeed, in her Petition, Petitioner expressly stated that neither party should receive 
alimony from the other (although she qualified her waiver by asking for temporary support). 
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totaling $29,777.29, must be refunded to Respondent as follows: After all marital assets have 
been divided, Respondent's reimbursement shall be drawn from Petitioner's share of the 
proceeds.13 
25. Pension, retirement, and 40IK accounts. The parties must account to, and arrange 
for, appropriate one-half credit to the other party for any retirement plans, pensions, or 40 IK 
accounts improperly accessed by either side without giving credit to the other. This includes the 
40 IK withdrawals by Respondent, the Hong Kong retirement benefits of Petitioner, and any 
other such accounts, if any.14 
26. Pursuant to the Divorce Agreement, the balances of the parties' defined 
contribution retirement accounts, and Respondent's defined benefit account, should be divided 
equally pursuant to properly prepared QDROs. 
27. Reimbursement for Fix-up and Repair expenses to Residence. Petitioner 
acknowledges that Respondent is entitled to reimbursement for the monies he expended in 
repairing the Residence prior to its sale in August 2006. The evidence at trial was that 
Respondent spent $7,616.09 in"fix up" costs. Presumably those expenditures enhanced the 
ability to sell the Residence, to the benefit of both parties. The Court concludes that it is fair and 
"Petitioner acknowledged at trial that at the time she withdrew these funds she was 
aware the Court had ordered the parties not to dissipate disputed assets, but proceeded to 
withdraw those funds anyway. 
14Based on the parties' submissions it appears Petitioner liquidated two retirement 
accounts, and Respondent accessed funds from at least one 40IK account. 
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appropriate that both parties share equally the cost of those repairs. Petitioner should reimburse 
Respondent for one half of those costs from her share of the equity in escrow.. 
28. Income Tax Returns. The Court need not address the division of income tax 
returns since the parties have already done so pursuant to their Agreement. To the extent, if at 
all, that the parties have filed taxes jointly since the time of the trial, any refund received (if any), 
should be equally divided. 
29. Attorney's fees In her Petition for Divorce Petitioner did not affirmatively seek 
attorney's fees as part of her requested relief. However, under the statute the Court can award 
fees equitably in the appropriate case, and before the Commissioner both parties asked that the 
issue be certified for trial. The Commissioner's Recommendation on this issue stated as follows: 
"There does not appear to be a basis for a finding that one party or another proceeded 
unreasonably in this matter. It would appear that respondent's overall financial situation is such 
that he could contribute towards petitioner's fees were the court to order fees." 
30. After considering the evidence at trial, the Court concludes that Petitioner only 
fully prevailed on one substantial claim-the one that recognized her interest in the Keams house. 
Nevertheless, as recommended by the Commissioner, and based on the salary difference between 
the parties ($177,000.00 to $198,000.00 for the Respondent; about $55,000.00 for the Petitioner), 
the Court concludes that Petitioner is in need of some assistance towards her attorney's fees, and 
Respondent is in a position to assist her. Therefore the Court concludes that Respondent should 
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assist Petitioner in the amount of $2,500.00 towards her attorney fees. The Court has 
deliberately limited Petitioner's attorney's fees because these awards are based on equitable 
considerations, and the Court concludes that Petitioner knowingly and willfully violated a Court 
order not to dissipate assets. The Court views Petitioner's actions to have been contemptuous of 
the Court's order. Because she does not come to Court with clean hands, the Court concludes 
that Petitioner is not entitled to a greater award. 
31. Moreover, the Court also concludes that Petitioner should be held responsible for 
the attorney's fees incurred by Respondent in bringing to the Court's attention Petitioner's 
wrongful removal of those funds from Respondent's account. Respondent's counsel is directed 
to submit an Affidavit of attorney's fees incurred on that issue alone. The Court will review the 
Affidavit in order to determine the reasonableness of the amounts claimed. 
32. Respondent's inheritance. Petitioner asserted a claim to one-half of Respondent's 
inheritance solely on the basis that she had retained signing authority on the account into which 
he deposited those funds (the former joint account) after May 2001. The Court categorically 
rejects Petitioner's claim and concludes that the inheritance was Respondent's sole and separate 
property. As indicated earlier, Respondent used some or all of the inheritance towards retiring 
the mortgage on the Residence. Therefore, he should receive full credit for that contribution 
from the escrowed funds. 
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Miscellaneous issues 
33. Other than otherwise addressed herein, the Court concludes that each party should 
be awarded all assets or debts in his or her individual name, free and clear of any claim or 
responsibility of the other party. 
34. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver any necessary documents to 
implement the findings of fact and conclusions of law identified herein. 
35. Petitioner has requested, and should be granted, a name change to Veronica 
HyunJoo Lee. 
ORDER 
36. Counsel are ordered to meet and identify the specific dollar amounts that should 
be awarded to each party in conformance with this decision. Respondent's counsel to take the 
lead in convening this meeting. 
37. Respondent's counsel is ordered to prepare, and promptly file, a Decree of 
Divorce consistent with these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VERONICA LEE JACOBSEN, RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND/OR TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
Petitioner, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW OR TO VACATE OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
-vs- THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
GUENTHER JACOBSEN,; Case No. 054905684 
Judge Denise Lindberg 
Respondent. Commissioner Casey 
COMES NOW THE RESPONDENT, Guenther Jacobsen, by and through counsel, Teny R. 
Spencer, and responds to the Motion For New Trial and/or to Alter or Amend the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law or to Vacate or Amend the Decree of Divorce as follows: 
Both of Petitioner's Motions to Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
untimely and should be denied. 
... Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 50, 52, and 59. See Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b) (stating 
that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be filed within ten 
days); id; 52(b) (stating that a motion to amend findings must be filed within ten 
days); id. 59(e) (providing that a motion to alter or amend judgment must be filed 
within ten days). Therefore, the motion to reconsider could not extend the time for 
filing an appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (listing certainpostjudgment motions that, 
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Radakovich v. Cornaby. 2006 UT App. 454. Further, even if Petitioner's Motion to Amend the 
Decree of Divorce was timely , the Decree restates the Court's Findings and Petitioner's time to 
object to the Findings has expired. Should the Court find the motion to Amend the Decree has merit, 
Respondent provides the following as a response to Petitioner's Motion to Amend the Decree of 
Divorce: 
PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner's f l . The telephone conference with the Court occurred on Friday, February 2, 
2007, not February 5, 2007, as stated by Petitioner. 
Petitioner's %2. Petitioner misstates the facts as found by the Court in her Statement of 
Facts, when she states she filed her proposed Findings electronically. The Court found that 
Petitioner did not file an electronic copy prior to the June 4, 2007 filling of the hard copy of 
Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In fact, the Court found that 
Petitioner failed to file an electronic copy of her proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
even after an additional request by the court clerk on June 21, 2007. Findings, p.2,11 5 thru 7. 
Petitioner's ^[3, 3 (sic), 4, 5, 6 & 7. Respondent's counsel attempted to speak with 
Petitioner's counsel regarding Petitioner's interpretation of the monies which should be awarded to 
each party. Petitioner's proposed allocation of the proceeds from the sale of the former marital 
residence was her proposed allocation and did not follow the Findings entered by the Court. 
However, after receiving the letter from Petitioner's counsel dated July 14, 2008, Respondent's 
counsel prepared and filed his proposed Decree of Divorce. Petitioner was provided a copy of the 
proposed Decree of Divorce by facsimile transmission on July 31, 2008, as well as a copy of the 
transmittal letter to the Court, which clearly indicated the document was being filed with the Court. 
Petitioner's reference to the letter as an "ex parte" communication is without merit, as Petitioner 
admits receiving a copy of the letter. As this court is aware, an ex parte communication with the 
Court is one that is "without notice to" or "without the opposite party having had notice..." Black's 
Law Dictionary 662, (4th Ed. Rev. 1972). Petitioner admits she was advised of the communication. 
Further, Respondent is unsure exactly what more "formal correspondence" Petitioner believes Rule 
7(f)(2) requires as the Rule contains no such requirement. The Rule states: 
Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, 
or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen 
days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in 
conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be 
filed within five^days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time 
to object. [Emphasis added.] 
Petitioner's f 8. Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Petitioner had five days, or not later than July 11, 
2008, which allows for an extra day for facsimile transmission after 5:00 p.m. and three days for 
mailing, to object to the proposed form of the Decree of Divorce. Petitioner failed to take any action. 
On or about August 15,2008, Respondent prepared a Notice to Submit for Decision, which 
was filed with the court on August 18, 2008. Petitioner still failed to file any objection to the 
proposed Decree of Divorce or even object to the Notice to Submit for Decision. The Court did not 
take any action on the proposed Decree of Divorce until after the time for Petitioner to object had 
expired. The Decree of Divorce was not signed until August 25,2008, and, again, Petitioner failed 
to file any objection with the Court or Respondent's counsel during the 24 days from the time 
Petitioner was served with the proposed Decree and the time the Decree was signed by the Court. 
Based on the foregoing, any objection to the Decree of Divorce pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) 
should be overruled and the Decree of Divorce should stand as entered. 
Petitioner's %9. Again, Petitioner misstates the facts. Although the judgment resulting 
from the Decree of Divorce was not entered until August 26,2008, the Decree of Divorce itself was 
signed by the Court on August 25, 2008 and entered as an order on August 25, 2008. Petitioner's 
Motion for a New Trial was filed, according to the Court Docket, later that same day, August 25, 
2008. 
Petitioner's [^10. Petitioner is correct that she previously objected to May 25,2001 as the 
date for division of the "joint" banking accounts. However, the Court considered Petitioner's May 
9, 2007 pleadings and found, due to the testimony at trial, that Petitioner did not provide any 
evidence to refute the May 9,2007 date and the Court found that "Respondent presented evidence 
(not contested by Petitioner) that the parties "separated their bank accounts on or before May 25, 
2001." Findings, p.7,1.6. The Court also found that the "undisputed testimony was that at the time 
the parties separated their accounts, all the money in what had been the "joint" account was divided 
50/50." Findings, p.7,11.10 & 11. 
Petitioner's f 11. Petitioner's concerns regarding the February 2005 value of Respondent's 
retirement accounts are also without merit. Perhaps Petitioner forgot that Respondent withdrew the 
monies from his retirement account in February 2005, even though those withdrawals were indicated 
by the parties' joint tax filings for 2005, which Petitioner agreed to sign after Respondent agreed to 
give her 100% of the parties' net tax refund in the sum of $3,560.00. 
Petitioner's f 12. As to the interest on the escrowed proceeds from the sale of the former 
marital residence, again, Petitioner is either forgetful or misstates the facts to the Court. Petitioner 
refused to file joint tax returns for the tax years 2006 and 2007, as previously agreed in the Divorce 
Agreement, which the Court found to be "an enforceable contract." Findings, p. 19, ^ [22. As a result 
of Petitioner's failure to comply with the Divorce Agreement, Respondent was forced to declare all 
of the interest from the escrow account on his tax return and pay taxes on that interest, even though 
Respondent had not received the monies. Petitioner chose not to declare any of the interest income 
on her tax returns for the appropriate tax year. Either all of the interest accumulated must be 
distributed to Respondent, who has already declared the income and paid taxes on that income, or 
both parties must file amended tax returns for the appropriate tax year. Petitioner would then owe 
taxes, and possibly interest and penalties, on that interest income and Respondent would receive a 
refund on Petitioner's portion of the interest income he was previously forced to declare as interest 
income on his tax filings. 
The transmittal letter to the Court, a copy of which Petitioner acknowledges receiving, clearly 
states the interest is still an outstanding issue and that Respondent would agree to any interlineations 
the Court deemed necessary. Again, Petitioner had 26 days to object and/or provide her position 
as to the award of the interest to the Court and Respondent prior to the Court signing the Decree of 
Divorce and she failed and refused to do so. In fact, Petitioner waited almost six weeks to object to 
the interest being awarded to Respondent. 
Petitioner's ^[13. Petitioner's concerns regarding the amount of the remaining sales proceeds 
is also without merit. The remaining sales proceeds number of $247,483.59 is correct because, as 
Petitioner points out, the Court did not address the issue of interest in its Findings. 
Petitioner's f 14. Petitioner's objection to paragraph 8(b)(1) of the Decree is actually an 
untimely objection to the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on June 19, 
2008. The language included in the Decree of Divorce was taken directly from the Court's 
Findings, page 9, 11. 11 thru 13, which states "Petitioner should be required to return those funds in 
full by having her share of the equity reduced by $29,777.29." Petitioner is, once again, filing an 
untimely objection to the Court's Findings. 
Respondent has not obtained a transcript of the oral ruling and Petitioner, although making 
multiple references to the oral ruling, did not provide a transcript of that ruling with her pleadings. 
As such, Respondent is unsure as to whether or not Petitioner's representations regarding the oral 
ruling of the court is correct or incorrect. However, the trial court does have the discretion to amend 
its oral ruling in its findings, especially after the length of time that passed and the proposed findings 
submitted by both parties and reviewed by the Court prior to the entry of the Findings. 
Petitioner's ^[15. Petitioner's concerns regarding the value of the personal property retained 
by her are, again, an untimely objection to the Findings entered by the Court on June 19,2008. The 
Court adopted the purchase price as the value of the disputed items. Findings, p.l 1, | C . Petitioner 
retained the Dining Room Set (not just the table), valued at $4,599.64; the Sony TV, valued at 
$2,020.54; and the Washer and Dryer valued at $ 1,648.32. Those items total value is $8,268.50 and 
Respondent's lA share of that amount is $4,134.25. 
Petitioner's f 16. Petitioner again, untimely, objects to the Court's Findings regarding the 
value of the VW Golf automobile. The Court found that "the only evidence presented to the Court 
was the value listed by Petitioner in her December 2005 financial declaration." [emphasis added.] 
Findings, p. 12,11.3 thru 4. The Decree correctly sets forth the findings of the Court and Petitioner's 
objection to this Finding is nothing more than a poorly disguised motion to reconsider the date of 
the valuation of the VW Golf. 
Petitioner's f 17. Once again, Petitioner is filing an untimely objection as to the Affidavit 
of Attorney's Fees filing by Respondent's counsel. Petitioner received a copy of the Affidavit of 
Attorney's Fees, together with the proposed Decree and transmittal letter to the Court on July 31, 
2008. Petitibner failed and refused to object to the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees until September 10, 
2008. The entry of the award of attorney's fees to Respondent was based on the Court's view that 
Petitioner's actions were "contemptuous of the Court's order." Findings, p.24,11. 4 thru 5. The 
Court also stated in its Findings that the Court would review the Affidavit in order to determine the 
reasonableness of the amounts claimed. Findings, p. 22, f20. 
Petitioner's ^ [18. Again, Petitioner is correct that the oral ruling did not specify whether the 
monies to reimburse Respondent for payment of Petitioner's pre-marital debt should be taken out 
prior to the division or not. However, if the monies are paid prior to the division of the remaining 
sales proceeds, Petitioner is not folly reimbursing Respondent the $14,417.21 as ordered by the 
Court. 
Petitioner's ^ [19. In objecting to the valuation of the retirement and stock options, Petitioner, 
once again, forgets that Respondent's retirement accounts and stock options were cashed out and/or 
exercised, taxes were paid in 2005 and Petitioner received the parties' entire tax refund. 
Petitioner's f20. Respondent has previously addressed Petitioner's concerns regarding the award 
of interest on the account in paragraph 10, above. 
Petitioner's Exhibit "D". Petitioner's table includes the following incorrect numbers: 
Estimated interest of $45,000.00, is excessive considering the recent drop in interest 
rates. Respondent estimates the interest to be between $39,000.00 and $40,000.00. Petitioner has 
discussed the distribution of the interest from the escrow account above. Petitioner has provided 
absolutely no basis for her receiving any tax free distribution of the interest earned on the escrow 
account, neither has she agreed to file amended tax returns and pay the taxes due and owing on those 
monies. 
Extra Mortgage Payments. Petitioner is, again, filing an untimely objection to the 
Court's Findings that Respondent should be awarded the extra payments he made to retire the 
mortgage while Respondent was living outside the country and using her financial resources to 
support herself and not contributing to the mortgage payments on the former marital residence. 
Petitioner, once again, is asking the Court to return to the oral ruling, which has been modified by 
the written Findings of the Court reach after the submission of proposed Findings by both parties. 
The Findings of the Court clearly state on page 11,11.6 thru 7 that "Respondent should be credit with 
the full value of those extra payments before equity in the Residence is allocated to the parties." 
[emphasis added.] Although, Petitioner stated in her February 21, 2007 response to Respondent's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "Respondent is entitled to reimbursement 
of his extra principal payments in the amount of $236,094.26..."[emphasis added], the Court did not 
limit reimbursement of Respondent's extra payments to principal and specifically found Respondent 
should be paid the "full value" of the extra payments. 
VW Golf. Petitioner again files an untimely objection to or request the Court 
reconsider the evidence at trial as to the valuation of the VW Golf vehicle. The Findings of the 
Court clearly state the value of the VW Golf vehicle will be as set forth by Petitioner in her 
December 2005 Financial Declaration. Petitioner declared the value of the VW Golf vehicle to be 
$10,275.00, as evidenced by a copy of Petitioner's Financial Declaration, page 3, 5(b), dated 
December 9, 2005, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. The 
$5,137.50 set forth in the Decree of Divorce is the correct amount Petitioner owes Respondent for 
his lA interest in the VW Golf. 
Furnishings. Petitioner's valuation of the furnishings does not include the full value 
of the furnishings she received as set forth above in response to Petitioner's paragraph 12. 
Stock Options. Petitioner's again requests valuation of the stock options and after 
tax 401 (k) as of the date of decree, not January 2002 and February 2005. Again, those are the dates 
those accounts were cashed out and Respondent paid the taxes due and owing on those distributions. 
Just as the value of Petitioner's retirement is the money she cashed out of her retirement. Any other 
retirement accounts, including the Petitioner's 401(k) valued at $40,539.99 as of June 30,2006, 
would be divided pursuant to qualified domestic relations orders as of the date of trial, the date the 
Court found the should be the division of all retirement accounts. Findings, p. 14, lines 1 thru 2 and 
fii.9. 
Petitioner's Exhibit "D" is a gross misrepresentation of the Findings of this Court and is, yet 
again, another untimely objection to the Findings of this Court entered on June 19, 2008. 
ARGUMENT I 
Petitioner's reliance on Rule 60 for relief from the entry of the Findings of Fact, entered on 
June 19, 2008 and the Decree of Divorce, signed on August 25, 2008, is without merit. The Utah 
Court of Appeals, in Henshaw v. Estate of Jack King, 2007 UT App 378, reaffirmed Petitioner's 
obligations as to the entry of any order. 
... we reaffirm the generally accepted rule that the moving parties in a 60(b)(6) 
motion asserting that they had no notice of the trial court's judgment must show 
either "diligence in trying to determine whether judgment had been entered," or that 
they were "actually misled.. . as to whether there had been entry of judgment."... 
Furthermore, "[o]ur rules... put the burden on counsel to check periodically with the 
clerk of the courf as to the date of entry of the findings and judgment so that post-trial 
motions may be timely filed." Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech. Inc.. 780 
P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1989) (holding that trial court did not err by failing to notify 
counsel promptly after signing findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment); 
see also West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997). [emphasis added.] 
Petitioner did not allege that she was not notified of the entry of the Findings. Petitioner 
cannot show that it was because she was not properly notified of the entry of the Findings, as her 
counsel was mailed a copy of the Findings by the court. As such, Petitioner cannot use Rule 60 as 
a defense for her failure to file timely objections to those Findings. 
Neither can Petitioner use Rule 60 as a basis to set aside the entry of the Decree. Petitioner 
acknowledges that she received a copy of the Decree of Divorce prepared by Respondent's counsel 
on or about July 31,2008. Petitioner also acknowledges that she received a copy of the transmittal 
letter to the Court. Petitioner's counsel had the burden to "check periodically with the court" to 
determine if and when the Decree was signed. 
Respondent's counsel made multiple attempts to meet with Petitioner's counsel, but was 
unsuccessful in arranging that meeting. As this Court is aware, fmalization of this matter has been 
unduly delayed. The Findings were entered by the Court on June 19, 2008 and required 
Respondent's counsel to "promptly file" the Decree of Divorce. Petitioner provided the exact same 
numbers included in her proposed Findings, which the Court refused to adopt, in response to 
Respondent's proposed numbers. Petitioner's counsel sent a letters to Respondent's counsel, but 
ever agreed to schedule an in person meeting or return a telephone call. Petitioner's counsel clearly 
stated in his letter "I will simply file an objection to the form of the Decree" and then failed to timely 
file such an objection. 
Lastly, Petitioner's counsel's failure to timely object to the Findings and/or the Decree "does 
not constitute "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," see Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)." 
Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134. 
ARGUMENT II 
Petitioner misstates Rule 7(f)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which Petitioner 
repeatedly states requires "formal" notice. Rule 7(f)(1) actually states: 
An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in 
writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be 
enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided 
by these rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated 
or modified by the judge who made it with or without notice. Orders shall state 
whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative, 
[emphasis added.] 
Petitioner does not dispute that she was provided notice of the filing of Respondent's proposed 
Decree of Divorce, together with the transmittal letter to the Court. There is no requirement in Rule 
7(f)(1) that a party provide some additional "formal" notice, or any specific requirement as to the 
form of the any additional notice. Petitioner was notified that the Decree was being filed with the 
Court and her request that the Decree be set aside pursuant to Rule 7(f)(1) should be denied. 
ARGUMENT III 
Petitioner has not provided any error in law or fact to support her motion for a new trial. 
Petitioner is providing only the same old arguments she made at trial and in her proposed Findings, 
which were not incorporated into the Court's Findings. Petitioner provided absolutely no case law 
or reference to the Court's Findings to support her position. Petitioner has not provided any newly 
discovered evidence relating to the facts as they existed at the time of trial and is only requesting the 
Court "reconsider" the evidence presented at trial. Such^evidence cannot support a motion to amend 
or alter under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See, In re Disconnection of Certain 
Territory. 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 1983);. InreS.R., 735 P.2d 53 (Utah 1987); Hancock v. Planned Dev. 
Corp., 791 P.2d 183 (Utah 1990). If the evidence existed at the time of trial and, it is not newly 
discovered evidence. Sge, Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp.. 791 P.2d 183 (Utah 1990). 
Petitioner has unsuccessfully attempted to disguise a motion to reconsider as a motion to 
amend. "Mere recitation of rule 59 does not convert a motion to reconsider into a legitimate motion 
for new trial." Cline v. State. 2007 UT App 111. 
Petitioner has not presented any new evidence that would justify the Court amending its 
Findings, especially in response to a motion filed well after the ten day deadline. Although 
Petitioner's motion is not titled "Motion to Reconsider," that is what relief the Petitioner is actually-
seeking from the Court. 
The filing of postjudgment motions to reconsider has become a common litigation 
practice, notwithstanding the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure's failure to authorize it 
and our previous attempts to discourage it. In this opinion, we consider whether this 
practice tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. We answer this question by 
absolutely rejecting the practice of filing postjudgment motions to reconsider. We 
also warn that future filings of postjudgment motions to reconsider will not toll the 
time for appeal and therefore may subject attorneys to malpractice claims. 
Gillett v. Price. 2006 UT 24. 
Based on the foregoing, both of Petitioner's postjudgment motions should be denied, the 
Court should find the time to appeal is not tolled and award Respondent his attorney's fees and costs 
incurred subsequent to trial as set forth in an affidavit of fees to be provided to the Court. In the 
alternative, this Court should award Respondent his attorney's fees and costs incurred subsequent 
to the entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See, Lvngle^ v. Lvngle. 831 P.2d 1027 
1031 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), (holding Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in an 
enforcement action regardless of ability to pay.) 
DATED THIS Z 3 day of S g p j - , 2008. 
a 
Terry K. Spencer 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I caused the foregoing to be delivered to Petitioner by faxing and mailing a true and correct 
copy to: 
John C. Green 
John C. Green, P.C. 
39 Exchange Place, #60 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the 2 3 day of September, 2008. 
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JOHN C. GREEN -1242 
JOHN C. GREEN, P.C. 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 60 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801)519-8090 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo— 
VERONICA LEE JACOBSEN, 
Petitioner, 
GUENTHER JACOBSEN, 
Respondent. 
¥£VL 
* — IN RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND/OR 
TO ALTER OR AMEND THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 054905684 
Judge Denise Lindberg 
-ooOoo-
COMES NOW, the Petitioner by and through her attorney of record, and respectfully files 
this response as follows: 
1. Contrary to the statement made by the Respondent at paragraph 1 of his response, 
"The court issues its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 19, 2008, 
almost eighteen months after the January 31,2007 trial in this matter. Petitioner did 
not voice any objection, either by pleadings or correspondence, either written or 
verbal, to the Court or Petitioner's counsel until August 26, 2008" 
that Petitioner did not voice any objections by pleading or correspondence until August 26, 
2008, it is submitted that Petitioner filed her objection to proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law which Respondent's counsel prepared and submitted on or about May 1, 2008. Petitioner 
filed an objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Ma> 9,2008. The subject bank 
account statements were attached as exhibit "A" to this particular objection. In Petitioner5 s objection 
at page 1, of the Objection provides as follows: 
"The wording, a final version was compiled by Petitioner, should be changed to read: 
"Following the parties negotiations a final version was compiled by the Respondent" 
to comport with the Petitioner's testimony at trial and the courts ruling, hi addition, 
the finding should include a statement that contrary to the Respondent's verified 
response to Motion for Temporary Order signed by the Respondent on the 23,d day 
of January, 2006, there was no oral modification of the subject agreement. This 
becomes important because in that response, the Respondent indicated that there had 
been an oral modification of the Divorce Agreement and that he complied with the 
terms of the oral modification by paying all monies due to the Petitioner. There was 
no evidence at trial that any such modification took place or than any payment was 
made." 
2. At pages 2 and 3 of the Objection, Petitioner suggested that proposed finding 4h(l) be 
changed and stated: 
"Paragraph 4h(l) should be changed to read" Petitioner oped a separate account in 
February 200L All income from Petitioner's employment went into this account 
after May of 2001,joint checking account number 603-44837-0 and joint savings 
account 003-681764 were maintained by the Respondent as his separate accounts. 
There was no division as of May, 2001. The bank balances as of May 26,2001 were 
as follows; joint savings: $8,037.89, joint checking $4,785.79, for a total of 
$12,823.68. As of that same date, the Petitioner's account balance was $5,409.12. 
This is an appropriate finding since there was no evidence other than 
Respondent's testimony adduced at trial to prove that the accounts were divided 
equally. On cross examination Respondent indicated that there was an e-mail 
reflecting information about the division of the accounts. No such e-mail however 
was included in the Respondent's trial binder. Copies of account balances are 
attached as exhibit "A"." 
2 
3. The Respondent at paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 suggests that Petitioner is asking the court to 
include evidence not adduced at trial, rearguing what date should be used to determine the division 
of the bank accounts and once again including evidence not adduced at trial without indicating that 
there is newly discovered evidence to support this Petition. It is submitted that there is no evidence 
before this court that, the bank accounts were divided prior to May of 2001, other than the 
Respondent's testimony during cross examination during the trial, Petitioner's counsel ask 
Respondent to provide evidence of the bank accounts being separated. The court actually interrupted 
the cross examination. 
MR. GREEN: Your honor, I'm simply asking him of there's anything in writing-
THE COURT : And he's answered. The answer is, he believes it's in the email. 
Q. MR. GREEN: Okay. Can you point out email where-
A Yes. 
Q. - that agreement is-
A. Email April 29th, where I wrote her an email to- on her American Express credit card, 
with the airline tickets she - then let me see. Then there is an email where she agrees to write a 
check, yeah, saying we had a balance in savings account before you transferred and so on. So 
basically the agreements exists in that way that we did it. See court transcript at page 194 lines 3 
throughI5. 
3 
The email of April 29, was never produced at trial. In actuality the email of April 29, 
addressed the Petitioner's American Express credit card bill, it had nothing to do with the division 
of bank accounts and as indicated above, Respondent adduced no evidence of the division. 
4. In response to the Respondent's statement at paragraph 5, that Petitioner provided no 
testimony to support her position that the accounts were or should have been divided at a different 
date. Petitioner has no problem with the fact that the court has determined that the accounts were 
divided. For this reason, it is reasonable that the court review the accounts as of May 26, as that 
should be the date of division because there is no physical evidence that there was a prior division 
of these accounts. 
5. At paragraph 7, once again Respondent indicates that the Judge stated "Respondent 
presented (not contested by Petitioner) that the parties separated their bank accounts on or before 
May 25, 2001." Once again the only evidence of the division was the testimony of the Respondent 
and his statement on cross examination that the division was outlined or agreed to in an e-mail was 
support by an alleged e-mail. The e-mail was never presented. The fact that there were bank 
accounts however is part of the record and therefore it is appropriate that the court consider the 
account balances at the end of May because no prior division had been made. 
6. At paragraph 11 the Respondent once again indicates that "the petitioner provided no 
evidence at trial." Once again it is submitted that the evidence relating to the fact that there were 
joint bank accounts is in the record. Petitioner is simply asking that the court consider an appropriate 
4 
day for dividing those accounts and to take into account the monies in the accounts at the end of May 
and include them as an appropriate calculation. 
7. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 14, as outlined in the Motion for 
new trial, the Petitioner and counsel at all times have in good faith, attempted to resolve the issues 
of the calculation ordered by the court to be completed by the parties but once again as outlined in 
the Motion the Respondent and counsel failed or neglected to respond m any way to Petitioner's 
request for meetings. 
Respectfully submitted this 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the C\Zo^3ay of September, 2008,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
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DAVID S PACE 
PACE & SCHMIDT 
136 E S TEMPLE STE 1600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 6 20C3 L y n 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
RE: Jacobsen v. Jacobsen Appellate Case No. 20080802 
Dear Mr. PACE, 
Please be advised that the notice of appeal in this case has been 
filed with the Utah Court of Appeals. The case number is 20080802 
and should be indicated on future filings and correspondence. 
Rule 11(e)(1) of: the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
that, within ten' days of the filing of the notice of appeal, 
appellant must submit a transcript request for such parts of the 
proceedings as the appellant deems necessary. The transcript 
request should be directed to the court executive in the trial 
court. A copy of the request should also be mailed to the clerk 
of the appellate court to which the appeal is taken. 
If no transcripts of the proceedings are to be requested, 
appellant must file a certificate to that effect with the clerk 
of the court from which the appeal is taken and a copy with the 
clerk of the appellate court. 
This court will permit documents of 10 pages (including 
attachments) or less that do not require a filing fee to be filed 
by fax. The faxed document, which must bear a facsimile of the 
required signature, will be accepted as an "original" document 
until the true original and any required copies are received by 
the court. The original must be received by this court within 5 
business days from the date of the transmission by fax. If the 
original is not received within that period, the court will treat 
the filing as void. A faxed filing is considered "received" when 
ADDENDUM "7" 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district or 
juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and 
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than 
the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only 
for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the 
appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a 
judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint 
notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of 
appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals 
may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a 
party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant and 
the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in 
consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original 
proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as 
the petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking 
the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate 
the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is 
taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a 
notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each 
party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at 
the party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice 
of appeal. If counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name of the 
party represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross 
appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the filing 
fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall accept a notice of appeal regardless of 
whether the filing fee has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee within a reasonable time may 
result in dismissal. 
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(g) Docketing of appeal Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court 
shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, 
and a statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid and whether the cost bond 
required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the 
appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title 
given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not 
contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title. 
History: Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996; November 1, 1999; 
November 1,2008. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of parties in the federal appellate 
courts. 
The rule is amended to make clear that the mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-appeal" does 
not eliminate liability for payment of the filing
 (and docketing fees. But for the order of filing, the 
cross-appellant would have been the appellant and s& should be required to pay the established fees. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2008 amendment, in Subdivision (f), substituted "shall accept a notice of 
appeal regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid" for "shall not accept a notice of appeal unless 
the filing fee is paid" and added the last sentence, and in the first sentence of Subdivision (g), deleted "and 
payment of the required fee" after "notice of appeal" near the beginning and substituted "a statement by 
the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid and whether the cost bond required by Rule 6 was filed" 
for "a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond has been filed, to the 
clerk of the appellate court." 
Cross-References. - Justice courts, appeals from, § 78A-7-118. 
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78A-6-1109. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
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Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings 
and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment 
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears 
immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, 
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out 
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation 
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a 
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
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with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the 
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief 
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of 
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited 
in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in 
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as 
part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions" 
of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or 
document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant 
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed 
except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and 
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency 
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
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injured person," "the taxpayer,'1 etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of 
published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of 
each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered 
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to 
exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility 
of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the 
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations., or portions 
of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph 
(g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court 
otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, 
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the 
appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in 
the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief," entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of 
Cross-Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the 
Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief While such motions are disfavored, the court for good 
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this 
rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional 
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days 
before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief 
is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief 
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for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal 
number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or 
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than 
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of 
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of 
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to 
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state 
the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. 
Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court mav assess attornev fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
History: Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November 1, 2006; 
April 1,2008. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 
1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully 
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Attorneys] must 
extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to 
properly discharge the [marshalling] duty..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 
(Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell 
v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, 
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law 
or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the 
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced 
to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by 
the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may 
be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against 
law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the 
entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision 
(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is 
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after 
such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 
days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court 
may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own 
initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on 
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
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(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 59, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. - Harmless error not ground for new trial, U.R.C.P. 61. 
Juror's competency as witness as to validity of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, Rule 606. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
© 2010 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. AH rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the 
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its 
own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. 
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
History: Amended effective April 1,1998, 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The 1998 amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and 
the defendant has failed to appear in said action." This basis for a motion is not found in the federal rule. 
The committee concluded the clause was ambiguous and possibly in conflict with rules permitting service 
by means other than personal service. 
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ADDENDUM u9 
CHAPTER 4 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78A-4-101. Creation - Seal. 
78A-4-102. Number of judges - Terms - Functions - Filing fees. 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78A-4-104. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78A-4-105. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78A-4-106. Appellate Mediation Office - Protected records and information - Governmental 
immunity. 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions 
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, 
and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
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(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or 
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a 
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of 
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited 
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the 
court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, ch. 
73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 1991, ch. 
268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 159, § 19; 
1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, ch. 255, § 20; 2001, ch. 302, § 2; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 3, § 
350; 2008, ch. 382, § 2210; 2009, ch. 344, § 42. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2008 amendment by ch. 3, effective February 7, 2008, renumbered this 
section, which formerly appeared as § 78-2a-3. 
The 2008 amendment by ch. 382, effective May 5, 2008, updated references to conform to the 
recodification of Title 63. 
The 2009 amendment, effective May 12, 2009, added the second comma in the name of the Division 
of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands. 
Cross-References. - Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16. 
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